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[Ilndependence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the
Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill
humors, which the arts of designing men or the influence of
particular conjunctures sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves; and which, though they speedily give place to better
information and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the
meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government,
and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.I
Alexander Hamilton
[Olur judges are effectually independent of the nation. But this
ought not to be. I would not, indeed, make them dependent on the
Executive authority, as they formerly were in England; but I deem it
indispensable to the continuance of this government, that they
should be submitted to some practical & impartial control; and that
this, to be imparted, must be compounded of a mixture of State and
* Judge, Florida First District Court of Appeal. B.S.F.S., 1971, Georgetown University;
J.D., 1974, Duke University; LL.M., 1995, University of Virginia. This Article is adapted from
a thesis submitted by the author in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Laws in the Judicial Process at the University of Virginia.
1. THF FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1966) (emphasis added).
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Federal authorities. It is not enough that honest men are appointed
judges. All know the influence of interest on the mind of man, and
how unconsciously his judgment is warped by that influence.2
Thomas Jefferson
I. INTRODUCTION
The debate over selection and tenure of judges has been ongoing
since shortly after the founding of our nation. Although frequently
not recognized as such, the debate is, in reality, but one manifestation
of a much more fundamental philosophical and political disagreement
regarding the role of judges in our political system. Should judges be
nothing more than interpreters of the law, searching some "corpus
juris" for the most appropriate rule, then applying that rule to the
particular controversy; or should judges perform the role of law-
makers and, if so, what are the legitimate limits of that role to be?
The response to this fundamental question will, to a major extent,
dictate the answer to whether judicial independence or judicial ac-
countability is viewed as a relatively more desirable and important
goal. This will, in turn, determine one's position in the debate regard-
ing alternative methods of judicial selection and retention.
This Article will first discuss the relationship between judicial the-
ory and choice of a method of judicial selection and retention. It will
then address what each of the principal alternative methods of judicial
selection and retention now in use does, and does not, accomplish.
Finally, it will propose a compromise method which might prove more
likely to satisfy all participants in the debate than does any of the
current alternatives.
II. JUDICIAL THEORY AND JUDICIAL SELECTION/RETENTION
The debate over the proper role of the judiciary and, consequently,
the appropriate method of judicial selection and retention, dates at
least to the time of Hamilton and Jefferson.3 As reflected by the
2. Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, in I TEe WiRnNs oF THOMAS JEmRSON 1, 121
(Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903) (emphasis added).
3. See, e.g., Philip L. Dubois, Accountability, Independence, and the Selection of State
Judges: The Role of Popular Judicial Elections, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue), May 1986, at 31,
37; Paul Nejelski, The Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian Duality: A Framework for Understanding Re-
forms in the Administration of Justice, 64 JUDICATURE 450, 451-52 (1981). In colonial Massa-
chusetts, there was considerable debate over the proper method of selection and retention of
judges-many favored elections, while others argued for appointment, with tenure during good
behavior. Similar differences of opinion existed in other parts of colonial America. Martha A.
Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Precedents, 1969
SuP. CT. REv. 135, 145-47.
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quotations at the beginning of this Article, the focus of that debate
has, since its genesis, been on the relative importance of the conflict-
ing concepts of independence and accountability. Without doubt, it
has been the inherent tension between these two discordant concepts
which, since the eighteenth century, has configured the debate over
the selection and tenure of judges. 4 Interestingly, however, notwith-
standing the much greater power wielded by federal courts than state
courts and the clear intent by the Framers that the federal judiciary be
shielded from virtually all methods of political accountability (except
the relatively unwieldy impeachment mechanism), 5 "[i]n [the last] 200
years, the nation has never seriously considered extending elections to
the federal courts." 6 Rather, for all practical purposes, the debate
over the relative values of judicial independence and accountability
has been limited to the states. 7 Resolution of this tension involves
choices essentially normative8 and political9 in nature. Those choices
are, to a major extent, dictated by perceptions about what the role of
courts in our society ought to be. 0
4. See, e.g., RUSSELL WHEELER, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: ITS RELATION TO JUDICIAL IN-
DEPENDENCE 16 (1988); Dubois, supra note 3, at 34; Theodore McMillian, Selection of State
Court Judges, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue), May 1986, at 9, 9; William M. Pearson & David S.
Castle, Alternative Judicial Selection Devices: An Analysis of Texas Judges' Attitudes, 73 Juni-
cATuRE 34, 34 (1989); Charles H. Sheldon, Judicial Selection Reform: Some First Principles,
WASH. ST. B. NEWS, July 1991, at 28, 28; Mary L. Volcansek, The Effects of Judicial-Selection
Reform: What We Know and What We Do Not, in THE ANALYSIS OF JuDIcIAL REFORM 79, 79
(Philip L. Dubois ed., 1982). One commentator has described the tension between the two con-
cepts as follows:
On the one hand, an independent judiciary, unco-opted by the political alms of the
ruling majority and willing to defend individuals' rights against government abuse,
seems crucial to liberal democracy .... On the other hand, the ability of an elite corps
of judges to wield enormous power that is unchecked by popular opinion and criticism
seems to contradict liberal democracy's fundamental premise.
Louis M. Seidman, Ambivalence and Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1571, 1571 (1988).
5. Such was the obvious intent behind the provisions in Article III, Section 1, of the Con-
stitution assuring life tenure "during good behavior" and prohibiting diminution of salary. See
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 78, 79, at 227-35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy. P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1966). See also Seidman, supra note 4, at 1588.
6. Hans A. Linde, Elective Judges: Some Comparative Comments, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1995,
1996 (1988). Nobody has offered an entirely convincing explanation, for this apparent paradox.
7. "The debate about selection of judges and about the proper balance between indepen-
dence and accountability is [also] undertaken in all Western countries in very similar terms."
Ruth Gavison, The Implications of Jurisprudential Theories for Judicial Election, Selection, and
Accountability, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1618, 1660 (1988).
8. See, e.g., Dubois, supra note 3, at 32-33; Pearson & Castle, supra note 4, at 34; Volcan-
sek, supra note 4, at 79.
9. As one commentator has expressed it, "[tihe process of picking a person to be a judge
is woven into the political fabric and is, by any definition, a political process." Daniel J. Mca-
dor, Some Yins and Yangs of Our Judicial System, 66 A.B.A. J. 122, 122 (1980).
10. See, e.g., PATRICK M. McFADDEN, ELECTING JUSTICE: THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
1995]
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A. Varying Perceptions Regarding the Role of Courts in Our Society
Today, one might be hard-pressed to find among those in legal aca-
demia anyone seriously advocating that the role of judges ought to
involve nothing more than searching the corpus juris for the correct
legal rule to apply to the facts of a particular dispute. Certainly,
Blackstone's concept of judges as "living oracles"" of the law has
long been out of vogue. On the contrary, one would, in all likelihood,
find many more proponents for the position found at the other end of
the philosophical spectrum. Most notable at that end of the spectrum
are the adherents of critical legal studies, who argue that law is noth-
ing more than politics disguised, and that judicial decisions are, in
fact, nothing more than political choices.' 2 I suggest that perceptions
of the American electorate regarding the appropriate role of judges in
society run along a similar, albeit frequently unrecognized, spec-
trum; 3 and that where upon that spectrum the views of the electorate
of any given state fall plays a significant role in where that electorate
will align itself in the debate over the values of independence and ac-
countability. Where that electorate stands in that debate will, in turn,
have a major impact upon the choice in that state of the method of
judicial selection and retention.
Logically, it would seem that one cannot begin to discuss in an in-
telligent manner whether it is more important to have judges who are
independent-free not only from intimidation and control by the ex-
ecutive and the legislature, but from similar threats by the majority of
the electorate as well-or judges who are accountable, either directly
or indirectly, to the electorate until and unless one first decides what
role judges are to play in the political and social spheres.14 Notwith-
standing the apparent logic of such a proposition, however, there ex-
ists a considerable body of legal literature which discusses with much
JurDiCIAL ELECTION CAmPAIGNS 7-8 (1990); Dubois, supra note 3, at 34-35; McMillian, supra note
4, at 9; Madison B. McClellan, Note, Merit Appointment Versus Popular Election: A Reform-
er's Guide to Judicial Selection Methods in Florida, 43 U. FLA. L. REv. 529, 544 (1991).
11. 1 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *69.
12. See, e.g., David Kairys, Legal Reasoning, in Twa POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE
CRmQuE 11, 16-17 (David Kairys ed., 1982).
13. See generally Joseph R. Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint: A Judge's Per-
spective on Judicial Retention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1972-73 (1988).
14. See, e.g., John Bell, Principles and Methods of Judicial Selection in France, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1757, 1757 (1988); Gavison, supra note 7, at 1619; McClellan, supra note 10, at 544. As
one commentator has aptly put it, "before we can talk seriously about how to select and retain
judges, we must have an idea of what they do and what they ought to do. As with any job, the
job description logically precedes the determination of qualifications." Frederick Schauer, Judg-
ing in a Corner of the Law, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1717, 1732 (1988).
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passion the relative importance of independence and accountability,
without considering either the role that judges play, or the role that
they ought to play, in society. 5
If one believes that judges possess no real discretion but, rather,
like Blackstone's judges, 16 must merely select the most appropriate
rule from some corpus juris of which they have superior or peculiar
knowledge, one might be less concerned with accountability, at least
in the sense of direct accountability to the electorate. 7 In such a judi-
cial system, the critical concern would be whether a particular judge
actually possesses such superior or peculiar knowledge regarding the
corpus juris. Presumably, in such a system, only other judges would
be competent to make that determination. Therefore, one would ex-
pect a greater willingness to involve judges in the selection and promo-
tion of their brothers and sisters,' s and to permit lengthy terms subject
only to some sort of peer review and critique. Fear of erroneous deci-
sions would be minimal, because of the availability of appellate re-
view. '9
15. See, e.g., IRVING R. KAus'AN, CMnu No JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE (1979); Norman Kri-
vosha, Acquiring Judges by the Merit Selection Method: The Case for Adopting Such a Method,
40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue), May 1986, at 15; Stephen C. O'Connell & Ernest E. Means, Should
Judges Be Selected by Merit Plan? Yes. .. , 40 FLA. B.J. 1146 (1966); Robert D. Raven, Does
the Bar Have an Obligation to Help Ensure the Independence of the Judiciary?, 69 JUDICATURE
66 (1985); Lester W. Roth, Why I Am Against The California Merit Plan, The Missouri Plan-
Or Any Reasonable Facsimile Thereof, 42 CAt. ST. B.J. 346 (1967); J. B. Spence, Should Judges
Be Selected by Merit Plan? No. . ., 40 FLA. B.J. 1147 (1966); Thomas E. Stanton, Jr., Why I
Am For the California Merit Plan, 42 CAL. ST. B.J. 356 (1967); Patrick W. Dunn, Comment,
Judicial Selection in the States: A Critical Study With Proposals for Reform, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv.
267 (1976).
16. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Dubois, supra note 3, at 36-37 (accountability becomes less of a concern "if
judges exercise no discretion or independent power, but serve merely as 'the detached conscience
of the society' and as the 'passive vehicle of constitutional verities' " (footnote omitted)).
18. Although not explicitly based upon such a view of the role of judges, participation of
judges in the selection and promotion of their brothers and sisters has been advocated on many
occasions, premised upon the argument that judges know best what qualities make a good judge,
and are best qualified to assess whether a given individual possesses those qualities. See, e.g.,
Harold J. Laski, The Technique of Judicial Appointment, 24 MICH. L. REv. 529, 538 (1926).
The precursor to what is today known as the "merit" plan of selection and retention, proposed
by Albert M. Kales (a professor of law at Northwestern University and a founder of the Ameri-
can Judicature Society) included a provision that appointments be made by the state's chief
justice. Glenn R. Winters, The Merit Plan for Judicial Selection and Tenure-Its Historical De-
velopment, in SELECTED READINGS ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE AND ITS IMPROVEMENT 2,
3 (Glenn R. Winters & R. Stanley Lowe eds., 1971). Judges participate in selection of their
brothers and sisters under both the "Missouri Plan," as implemented in that state, see Richard
A. Watson, Observations on the Missouri Nonpartisan Court Plan, 40 Sw. L.J. (Special Issue),
May 1986, at 1, 2, and the "California Plan" in use in that state, see Joseph R. Grodin, Judicial
Elections: The California Experience, 70 JUDICATURE 365, 365 (1987).
19. See generally KAUFMAN, supra note 15, at 30-33 (arguing that the hierarchical and col-
lective nature of appellate review, and peer pressure, are two strong internal mechanisms which
ensure accountability).
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At the other end of the spectrum, if one believes that the process of
judging involves unbridled discretion-that it is based upon nothing
more than the personal or political proclivities of each individual
judge-direct accountability to the electorate becomes much more im-
portant, indeed, perhaps paramount. If judges are making decisions
based upon such considerations, why should they not be required to
submit themselves periodically to the electorate, for approval or dis-
approval of their record of decision-making, just as legislators are?20
Some, perhaps a majority, contend that the correct picture regard-
ing what judges do in society, and the most desirable answer to the
normative question of what they ought to do, lies somewhere between
these two extremes; and that the precise position within that gray area
depends upon the type of court being discussed. 2' This group which, I
submit, would likely include most judges, would probably argue that
most of the work of trial and intermediate appellate courts, especially
in state systems, consists of the mundane application of more-or-less
well-established legal rules. Only a small portion of the work of such
courts involves what might fairly be called the development of new
law. They would argue that this development of new law is of two
principal types. The first involves modification, extension or contrac-
tion of the common law. This is clearly nothing new-it has been go-
ing on for hundreds of years. The second, which is of more recent
vintage, involves statutory interpretation. Here, the development of
law consists essentially of a type of gap-filling procedure, by which
courts attempt either to fill voids left by the legislature in a particular
statutory scheme; or to determine whether, given a factual scenario
not contemplated by the legislature, the legislature would have in-
cluded that scenario within the ambit of the law. This group would
probably assert that it is only in this latter and relatively infrequent
area of statutory interpretation that the roles of judges and legislators
have any real similarity. In their view, even the work of most of the
states' highest appellate courts does not consist principally of the de-
velopment of new law. Moreover, to the extent that the electorate
20. This concept of the role of judges has been expressed by a proponent of partisan elec-
tion of judges as follows:
One cannot but conclude that judges are, in behavioral fact, partisan political officers
vested with political authority whose use is affected by partisan dispositions. Because
of the great authority vested in judges it must be accepted as a fact that they formulate
public policy. It seems logical, therefore, that judicially determined political policies
should and must conform to the will of the people.
Ray M. Harding, The Case for Partisan Election of Judges, 55 A.B.A. J. 1162, 1163 (1969).
21. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 13, at 1974-76.
22. Id.
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might be dissatisfied with the direction taken by a court in its develop-
ment of new law, it frequently has the power to overrule the court's
action.23 Thus, in their view, direct accountability to the electorate
would not be particularly important. 24
Also to be considered is the view that one of the principal purposes
of the judicial branch is to protect individuals and minorities from
encroachments upon their rights, whether from one of the other
branches of government or from the majority of the electorate." The
importance of this counter-majoritarian role of the courts can, per-
haps, best be perceived as running along another spectrum. At times,
it acts as a confounder, blurring the clarity of the distinctions which
generally characterize the opposite ends of the accountability-
independence spectrum.
According to such a view, judges are expected (indeed, it is their
duty) to make decisions which effectively change the law, even though
the changes might prove to be unpopular with one of the other
branches of government or with the majority of the electorate, in or-
der to protect individual or minority rights. 26 Although particularly
true in the constitutional arena,2 7 this view is by no means limited to
constitutional issues. Rather, it is applicable whenever protection of
individual or minority rights and the will of the majority are at odds.,,
Accordingly, proponents of this view assert that judges must be to-
tally free, independent and shielded from reprisal, whether by threat
23. See Grodin, supra note 18, at 369 (arguing that decisions based upon the federal Consti-
tution are subject to review by the United States Supreme Court; decisions based upon the state
constitution can be overcome by constitutional amendment, for which initiative and referendum,
as well as legislative proposal, are available; and decisions based either upon common law or
statutory interpretation can be negated by the legislature or, in some cases, by citizen initiative).
24. See generally Lawrence A. Alexander, Legal Theory and Judicial Accountability: A
Comment on Seidman, 61 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1601, 1605 (1988) (positing that less accountability
will be perceived as necessary, and greater independence will be tolerated, to the extent that the
work of judges is uncontroversial, involving the application of more-or-less established legal
rules, rather than the creation of new law); see also Dubois, supra note 3, at 36-37.
25. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231-32 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d
ed. 1966).
26. See, e.g., KAUtMAN, supra note 15, at 9-12; Grodin, supra note 13, at 1979; Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr., Judicial Selection: The Political Roots of Advice and Consent, in JUDICtAL SELEC-
TION: MERT, IDEOLOGY, AND POLITICS 3, 4-5 (National Legal Center for the Public Interest ed.,
1990).
27. The view that such a counter-majoritarian role may be critical in the adjudication of
certain types of constitutional issues is expressed in the famous footnote 4 of the Carolene Prod-
ucts opinion. United States v. Carolene Products, Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). It is also
the unexpressed basis for a great number of the decisions of the Warren Court in cases involving
individual and minority rights. See generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73-75
(1980).
28. See Grodin, supra note 13, at 1979.
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of removal or otherwise, because of popular discontent with their de-
cisions. 29 However, as others have quite correctly noted, while judges
who are not subject to direct accountability to either of the other two
branches or the electorate are free to act as the protectors of individ-
ual and minority rights, nothing guarantees that they will.30 Moreover,
it has been argued that state judges do not require the same degree of
independence as federal judges, because state judges are called upon
less frequently to protect individual and minority rights-the federal
judiciary already exists for that purpose.3
B. Independence vs. Accountability: The Arguments
Any objective analysis of the two positions in this debate must be-
gin with the recognition that, more often than not, the respective ar-
guments involve a great deal more heat than light.32 Proponents of
each position will frequently extol the virtues of the one quality, while
29, Alexander Hamilton stated the proposition as follows:
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution and of indi-
viduals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly
not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission. Peri-
odical appointments, however regulated or by whomsoever made, would, in some way
or other, be fatal to their necessary independence. If the power of making them was
committed either to the Executive or legislature, there would be danger of an improper
complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would be an unwill-
ingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people or to persons chosen by
them for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult popu-
larity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and
the laws.
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 232 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966). More
recently, the concept has been expressed as follows:
[I]deally[,] public opinion should be irrelevant to the judge's role because the judge is
often called upon to disregard, or even to defy, popular sentiment. The Framers of the
Constitution had a similar understanding of the judicial role, and as a consequence,
they established that Article III judges would be appointed, rather than elected, and
would be sheltered from public opinion by receiving life tenure and salary protection.
Indeed, these views were generally shared by the States during the early years of the
Republic.
Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 400 (1991) (footnote omitted).
30. See, e.g., Dubois, supra note 3, at 39; Seidman, supra note 4, at 1581-82; Mark Tush-
net, Constitutional Interpretation and Judicial Selection: A View from The Federalist Papers, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 1669, 1681 (1988).
31. See Robert S. Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retro-
spective on the California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2007, 2055-56 (1988).
However, it has been argued that the "suggestion that independence is not as essential for state
judges because we have Article III judges to protect minorities in federal court is disingenuous
[because t]he issues that state judges are most vulnerable on are issues that are, as a practical
matter, immune from federal review." Gerald F. Uelmen, Commentary: Are We Reprising a
Finale or an Overture?, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 2069, 2072 (1988).
32. See generally KAumaN, supra note 15; Dubois, supra note 3, at 31; Krivosha, supra
note 15, at 18.
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excoriating the dire consequences of elevating the other. More often
than not, no empirical evidence is offered in support of the argu-
ments.
Those who believe that independence is the more important quality
base their position principally upon the argument that judges cannot
make the hard decisions-particularly those in cases of great public
interest-unless they are truly independent.33 According to this group,
a judge who is dependent upon the continued approval of another,
whether it be one of the other branches of government or the elector-
ate, cannot reasonably be expected to decide cases in a way likely to
provoke the disfavor of those who will decide whether that judge will
remain on the bench.34 They also argue that it is important not only
that judges be independent in fact, but also that they be perceived as
independent by society.
The argument that it is important not only that judges be indepen-
dent, but that they be perceived as independent as well, runs as fol-
lows. In our society, the power and authority of the judiciary depend
upon the public's continued respect and support for that institution.
One of the cornerstones of our system is respect for the "rule of
law." Therefore, the public's degree of respect for the judiciary bears
a direct correlation to the belief that judges will decide cases fairly and
impartially, in accordance with the "rule of law"-that decisions will
be reached based upon the facts and the applicable law, without re-
gard to extraneous influences, whether in the form of special interest
groups or popular opinion.35
According to this view, even if one accepts the possibility that, de-
spite their humanity, judges could somehow disregard the likely re-
sponse to a decision unpopular with the entity holding the power to
decide their continued tenure on the bench, the perception would still
remain that such considerations do affect the outcome of
33. The elements generally associated with the concept of "true independence" include life
tenure during good behavior, a prohibition against diminution of salary, and removal only for
serious offenses by means of a procedure which ensures the safeguards associated with due pro-
cess of law. See, e.g., KAUFImAN, supra note 15, at 17; WHEELER, supra note 4, at 10-12.
34. As expressed by one commentator, "judges cannot be independent if they know that
their decisions, irrespective of the way in which they reached and justified them, may cost them
their job." Gavison, supra note 7, at 1657. Retired Judge Otto Kaus, of the California Supreme
Court, has expressed this sentiment somewhat more colorfully: " 'There's no way a judge is
going to be able to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if he or she
has to make them near election time. That would be like ignoring a crocodile in your bath
tub.' " Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1, 1987, at 52, 58. See also
Raven, supra note 15, at 66.
35. See generally Abner J. Mikva, How Should We Select Judges in a Free Society?, 16 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 547, 555 (1992).
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controversial cases.3 6 The inevitable result is a diminution of respect
and support for the judiciary as an institution. Such a perception is
especially likely in a system which requires judges periodically to sub-
mit themselves to popular election. The need to curry favor with those
capable of influencing large numbers of voters, together with the con-
comitant need to raise funds, indubitably creates the impression of
some sort of quid pro quo.
7
Finally, proponents of independence argue that judges are not like
legislators. 3 Judges are not politicians-they are charged with inter-
preting the law, not making it. 9 Moreover, judges do not, and should
not, have a constituency. They do not represent anyone.4 0 Rather,
they represent the law. Accordingly, it makes no sense whatsoever to
require that they be accountable to the electorate, like legislators and
other politicians .4 '
Those who believe that accountability is of paramount importance
contend that judges are, indeed, just like legislators. According to
them, judges make policy daily.42 In fact, with respect to some mat-
ters, judges have more political power than legislators, because they
have the ability to thwart the will of the majority 3.4
36. See, e.g., John L. Hill, Jr., Comments on Thompson and Observations Concerning
Impartiality, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2065, 2065 (1988).
37. See, e.g., Philip L. Dubois, Financing Trial Court Elections: Who Contributes to Cali-
fornia Judicial Campaigns?, 70 JUDICATURE 8, 9 (1986); Mark Hansen, The High Cost of Judg-
ing, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1991, at 44, 44-45; Orrin W. Johnson & Laura J. Urbis, Judicial Selection
in Texas: A Gathering Storm?, 23 TEX, TECH. L. REv. 525, 536 (1992); Krivosha, supra note 15,
at 19; Robert Moog, Campaign Financing for North Carolina's Appellate Courts, 76 JUDICA-
TORE 68, 70 (1992).
38. See, e.g., Michael H. Shapiro, Introduction: Judicial Selection and the Design of
Clumsy Institutions, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 1555, 1559-63 (1988); John J. Korzen, Comment,
Changing North Carolina's Method of Judicial Selection, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 253, 260
(1990).
39. See, e.g., Robert P. Davidow, Judicial Selection: The Search for Quality and Represen-
tativeness, 31 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 409, 420-22 (1981); Hickok, supra note 26, at 4-5; Ben F.
Overton, Trial Judges and Political Elections: A Time for Re-examination, 2 U. FLA. J.L. &
PuB. Pot'" 9, 15-17 (1988-89).
40. "Courts are not representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of a
democratic society .... Their essential quality is detachment, founded on independence." Den-
nis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also Hill, supra
note 36, at 2065.
41. See Krivosha, supra note 15, at 15-18.
42. See supra note 20. See also Dubois, supra note 3, at 37-38; Sheldon, supra note 4, at 29;
Lawrence B. Solum, The Virtues and Vices of a Judge: An Aristotelian Guide to Judicial Selec-
tion, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (1988).
43. Theodore Roosevelt was a particularly vocal critic of what he perceived as conservative
decisions by the courts, which repeatedly used the federal and state constitutions to thwart pro-
gressive social reforms supported by the overwhelming majority of the electorate and enacted by
the legislature. See Michael R. Belknap, From Pound to Harley: The Founding of AJS, 72 JUDI-
CATURE 78, 81 (1988).
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In the minds of this group, ours is a nation founded upon the con-
cept of representative democracy. If, in fact, judges routinely make
policy decisions, a lack of electoral accountability runs counter to
those democratic principles which we hold most dear." Moreover,
judges, being human, are as likely to be fallible as anyone else. There-
fore, it is imperative that they be accountable for their decisions.
Finally, there is the fear that judges who are not accountable pose a
significant threat to society. This threat is manifested in the potential
for the judiciary to become an anti-majoritarian, anti-democratic
elite 5 bent on pursuing goals which are not only inconsistent with
those of the majority, but are also a real danger to the political foun-
dation upon which this nation was built.
III. THE PRINCIPAL METHODS OF SELECTION/RETENTION:
EXPECTATIONS AND REALITIES
Any discussion of the various current methods of judicial selection
and retention must begin with recognition of the fact that all of those
systems involve, in one form or another, political considerations."*
The degree to which partisan political considerations are implicated
depends to a large extent upon where on the independence/
44. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Evaluating Judicial Candidates, 61 S. CAL. L. REv.
1985, 1988 (1988); Seidman, supra note 4, at 1571; Thompson, supra note 31, at 2062.
45. See, e.g., John D. Felice & John C. Kilwein, Strike One, Strike Two... : The History
of and Prospect for Judicial Reform in Ohio, 75 JUDICATURE 193, 197 (1992); Seidman, supra
note 4, at 1571; Stephen L. Carter, Is Democracy a Threat to Judicial Independence? 3 (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The Roscoe Pound Foundation). Jefferson expressed this
concern as follows:
Our judges are as honest as other men, and not more so. They have, with others, the
same passions for party, for power, and the privilege of their corps. Their maxim is
"boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem, " and their power the more dangerous as
they are in office for life, and not responsible, as the other functionaries are, to the
elective control.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820), in 15 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 276, 277 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903).
46. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, The Selection and Retention of Judges in Texas, 40
Sw. L.J. (Special Issue), May 1986, at 53, 111; John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Judicial Re-
form in California, in JUDicIAL REFORM IN TE STATES 139, 160 (Anthony Champagne & Judith
Haydel eds., 1993); Meador, supra note 9, at 122; Korzen, supra note 38, at 278. As one com-
mentator has noted, "every system of judicial selection other than some form of competitive
civil service examination ha[s] to be political." Linde, supra note 6, at 1998. Jurists who are
selected based upon merit, and who become career civil servants, are not uncommon in some
parts of Europe. See generally Bell, supra note 14; David S. Clark, The Selection and Account-
ability of Judges in West Germany: Implementation of a Rechtsstaat, 61 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1795
(1988). Similar concepts for the selection and retention of judges have been suggested from time
to time in this country. E.g., Robert P. Schifferman, Does Justice Require a Career Judiciary?,
72 JUDICATURE 265 (1989). However,. for some reason, such proposals have never gone any-
where.
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accountability spectrum the particular method falls. Another critical
fact which must be kept in mind when discussing the various methods
in use is that what the proponents of a particular method claim it ac-
complishes and what the empirical evidence suggests it accomplishes
are often very different.4
7
Although at times categorized somewhat differently, 48 for all practi-
cal purposes the various methods of selection and retention of judges
currently in use in the states fall under one of the following general
headings: appointment, partisan election, nonpartisan election and
commission selection (commonly referred to as "merit" or "merit
plan" selection). However, there are both variants and hybrids of
these methods in use.4 9 Moreover, an individual state will frequently
employ different methods for different types of judges. 0 In addition,
notwithstanding the method or methods in use in a particular state,
the fact remains that most judges in most states initially reach the
bench by appointment." This fact makes it considerably more diffi-
cult to evaluate empirically the claims made regarding the respective
methods. Each of the four methods will be discussed in turn.
A. Appointment
Appointment of judges was initially the prevalent method of
selection in the states. 2 However, based upon their experiences while
47. See, e.g., Martin I. Kaminsky, Available Compromises for Continued Judicial Selection
Reform, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 466, 468 (1979).
48. See. e.g.. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JtUDICIAL PROCESS 21-22 (6th ed. 1993); McFADDEN,
supra note 10, at 5; Pearson & Castle, supra note 4, at 34; John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The
Arizona Experience, 22 Asm. ST. L.J. 837, 84547 (1990).
49. See, e.g.. LARRY BERKSON ET AL., JUDICIAL SELECTION n TE UNIrrED STATES: A COM-
PENDrum OF PROVISIONS 6 (1981); McFADDEN, supra note 10, at 5-6. In Pennsylvania, for in-
stance, judges are generally initially appointed by the governor to fill an unexpired term, subject
to a confirmation vote by the senate. After completing the interim term, judges must seek a 10-
year term in a partisan election. Upon completion of the first 10-year term, incumbents stand for
retention at 10-year intervals. The electorate is merely asked whether the judge should be re-
tained in office. See Voorhees E. Dunn, Jr., Judicial Reform in Pennsylvania, in JUDICIAL RE-
FORM IN THE STATES, 117, 120 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
50. See, e.g., BERKSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 6-7; McFADDEN, supra note 10, at 6;
Champagne, supra note 46, at 57. In Florida, for instance, all appellate judges are selected by
use of the "merit" plan, and are subject to periodic retention elections. However, all trial judges
must stand periodically in contested nonpartisan elections. See SARA MATHIAS, ELECTING
JUSTICE: A HANDBOOK OF JUDICIAL ELECTION REFORMS 142-43 (1990).
51. This is because, as a rule, even states which select judges by partisan election provide
for interim appointment by the governor of judges to complete unexpired terms. See, e.g., Mc-
FADDEN, supra note 10, at 6; Philip L. Dubois, State Trial Court Appointments: Does the Gov-
ernor Make a Difference?, 69 JUDICATURE 20, 20-21 (1985); Henry R. Glick, The Promise and
the Performance of the Missouri Plan: Judicial Selection in the Fifty States, 32 U. MIAMI L.
R-Ev. 509, 516 (1978); Kaminsky, supra note 47, at 468-69; Krivosha, supra note 15, at 19.
52. See Norman Krivosha, In Celebration of the 50th Anniversary of Merit Selection, 74
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English colonies, the original thirteen states were reluctant to place
complete power regarding selection of judges in the hands of a single
individual. Accordingly, eight of the thirteen placed the power to ap-
point judges in the hands of their legislatures,5 3 and the remaining five
permitted the governor to make appointments, but the appointments
were subject to approval by either the legislature or council.14 The ma-
jority of those states adopted the federal model of life tenure during
good behavior."
Today, regardless of the method of selection generally in use in a
given state, in the majority of states the governor, alone or with the
advice or consent of some other body, initially appoints judges to fill
unexpired terms. 6 However, appointment is still employed as the prin-
cipal method of selection in only six states, all of which lie along the
east coast.57 The procedures are not uniform in those states.5"
Proponents of the appointive method of selection and retention ar-
gue that it is the best means available to ensure the independence of
judges, because it insulates judges from periodically having to submit
themselves (and their sometimes controversial decisions) to the
JUDICATURE 128, 128 (1990); Glenn R. Winters, Some Notes on the History of Judicial Selection
and Tenure in America, in SELECTED READINGS ON TE ADMIlSTRATION OF JUSTICE AND ITS
IMPROVEMENT 1, 1 (Glenn R. Winters & R. Stanley Lowe eds., 1971); Ziskind, supra note 3, at
138-46.
53. See Grodin, supra note 13, at 1970. The eight states were Connecticut, Rhode Island,
New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and Georgia. Id.; see also Roll,
supra note 48, at 840.
54. See Grodin, supra note 13, at 1970. The five states were New Hampshire, Massachu-
setts, New York, Pennsylvania and Maryland. Id.; see also Roll, supra note 48, at 840.
55. See Grodin, supra note 13, at 1970.
56. See supra note 51.
57. The six states are Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Rhode Island, South Carolina
and Virginia. See McFADDEN, supra note 10, at 177; MATIAS, supra note 50, at 142. Of course,
appointment is also the method by which federal judges reach the bench. See U.S. CONsT. art.
11, § 2, cl. 2.
58. In Maine, supreme court and superior court judges are appointed by the governor for a
7-year term, and may be reappointed for like terms by the governor, subject to legislative confir-
mation. In New Hampshire, supreme court and superior court judges are appointed by the gov-
ernor, subject to the approval of a 5-member executive council, after which they hold office until
age 70. In New Jersey, supreme court, appellate division and superior court judges are appointed
by the governor for a 7-year term, and may be reappointed until age 70 by the governor, subject
to the advice and consent of the senate. In Rhode Island, supreme court judges are appointed by
the legislature, and superior court judges are appointed by the governor, both for a life term. In
South Carolina, supreme court judges, court of appeals judges and circuit court judges are ap-
pointed by the legislature, the former for a 10-year term and the rest for a 6-year term; all may
be reappointed for like terms by the legislature. In Virginia, supreme court judges, court of
appeals judges and circuit court judges are appointed by the legislature, the former for a 12-year
term and the rest for an 8-year term; all may be reappointed for like terms by the legislature. See
MCFADDEN, supra note 10, at 181-87.
14 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
electorate for approval.5 9 In addition, they argue that the appointive
method results in the selection of "better" judges. This argument is
based upon the proposition that the electorate does not have the nec-
essary background to comprehend what qualities make a "good"
judge and that, as a result, voters are unqualified to make such deci-
sions. Instead, they are more likely to be influenced by irrelevant con-
siderations. Accordingly, it makes much more sense to place
responsibility for such matters in the hands of an individual or group
possessing adequate knowledge and understanding.60
Proponents argue that a degree of accountability to the electorate is
still present, because the appointing authority, whether the chief exec-
utive officer or all or some part of the legislature, can be held to an-
swer to the electorate for poor appointments. 61 Appointment also
avoids the unseemly aspects of participation by judicial candidates in
contested elections. 62 Finally, proponents argue that the appointive
method is more likely to bring minorities and women to the bench
than are contested elections. 63
It is certainly true, as proponents of appointive methods of selec-
tion and retention contend, that, of the various methods in use in the
United States today, appointment (coupled with long tenure) is most
likely to ensure the independence of judges.64 But not everyone is an
ardent supporter of a system in which judges are, for all practical pur-
poses, free of all constraints upon their actions. For, while judges who
are free of all meaningful constraints (truly independent) are, indeed,
in a position to decide matters impartially and without concern for
how their decisions will be received by the public, there is no guaran-
tee that they will do so.65 Thus, "[tihe advantage of the appointment
process is, depending on one's ideology, also its weakness. That is, the
system promotes judicial independence by having no substantial check
on the judge after the confirmation process." 6 In return for true inde-
pendence, one must face the rather substantial risk that judges will
59. This position is generally based upon the assumption that appointment is coupled with
long tenure in office, preferably life. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 48, at 33, 39; Laski, supra
note 18, at 531-33.
60. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 48, at 33; Laski, supra note 18, at 531.
61. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 48, at 33-34.
62. See, e.g., Laski, supra note 18, at 531-32.
63. See generally Nicholas 0. Alozie, Distribution of Women and Minority Judges: The
Effects of Judicial Selection Methods, 71 Soc. Scs. Q. 315 (1990).
64. See, e.g., Korzen, supra note 38, at 274.
65. See supra note 30.
66. Champagne, supra note 46, at 58.
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pursue personal agendas, either political or otherwise, which are at
odds with their responsibilities. 67
The argument that those selected by the appointive method make
"better" judges is a difficult one to address because of the subjective
and normative considerations necessarily involved in any attempt to
define the characteristics of a "good" judge. 6 Empirical work sug-
gests that the method of selection has little, if any, effect upon the
overall quality of judges.69 However, the empirical evidence does sug-
gest that more minorities and women have reached the bench by ap-
pointment than by election.70 In the case of minorities, it has been
suggested that this phenomenon might be attributable to the preva-
lence of at-large judicial elections .71
The empirical evidence does suggest that voters generally do not
possess the knowledge required for the intelligent selection of judges. 72
However, there is nothing to suggest that governors or legislators
67. See generally Seidman, supra note 4, at 1572; Tushnet, supra note 30, at 1681.
68. See generally Culver & Wold, supra note 46, at 160; Volcansek, supra note 4, at 79-80;
M. L. Henry, Jr., Characteristics of Elected Versus Merit-Selected New York City Judges, 1977-
1992 1 (Apr. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Fund for Modern Courts).
69. See generally CommossioN ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY, STATE OF NEW YORK, BECOmING
A JUDGE: REPORT ON THE FAILros OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS IN NEW YORK STATE 7 (1988); Cham-
pagne, supra note 46, at 111; Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial
Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 228, 233
(1987); Dunn, supra note 15, at 289. Notwithstanding the lack of empirical support, proponents
of an appointive system argue that the "best" lawyers are more likely to make themselves avail-
able to become judges in a system which assures them life tenure during good behavior, without
the need to campaign for election. See generally Dubois, supra note 37, at 9; W. St. John Gar-
wood, Judicial Selection and Tenure-The Model Article Provisions, 47 JUDICATURE 21, 25
(1963).
70. See, e.g., BECOMING A JUDGE, supra note 69, at 40-42; Barbara L. Graham, Do Judicial
Selection Systems Matter?. A Study of Black Representation on State Courts, 18 AM. POL. Q.
316, 331 (1990); Minority Judges, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1, 1986, at 19, 19. But see Alozie, supra note
63, at 315-16, 321-24 (suggesting selection method has little effect on number of minorities and
women on bench; most important correlate of representation on bench is number of lawyers in
jurisdiction who are members of group); Champagne, supra note 46, at 106 (contending no
method is clearly more successful in recruiting minorities and women).
71. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 70, at 331; Robert C. Luskin et al., How Minority
Judges Fare in Retention Elections, 77 JUDICATURE 316, 316 (1994).
72. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform in Texas, 72 JUDICATURE 146, 151
(1988); Champagne, supra note 46, at 93-95; Marie Hojnacki & Lawrence Baum, Choosing Judi-
cial Candidates: How Voters Explain Their Decisions, 75 JUDICATURE 300, 300 (1992); Nicholas
P. Lovrich et al., Citizen Knowledge and Voting in Judicial Elections, 73 JUDICATURE 28, 28-29
(1989); Volcansek, supra note 4, at 80. A poll conducted in Oklahoma in 1966 disclosed that
7407o of those asked could not name any of the six candidates for the supreme court. Oklahoma
Poll Shows Court Voters in the Dark, 50 JUDICATURE 134, 134 (1966). A poll conducted in
Pennsylvania "in 1983 revealed that 'fewer than one in ten voters knew the names of any appel-
late court candidates before going to the polls' and 'the vast majority of voters-more than
90%---spent little or no time studying the qualifications and background of appellate court can-
didates.' " Dunn, supra note 49, at 125 (footnote omitted).
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necessarily possess such knowledge. Moreover, while judicial elections
are becoming increasingly politicized,73 the evidence indicates that ap-
pointments are most often based principally upon political considera-
tions, rather than qualifications. 74 Clearly, the appointive method
does nothing to lessen the effect of partisan politics upon the selection
of judges. On the contrary, it would appear that, at the very least,
there is significant potential for partisan politics to play the determi-
native role in the selection of judges in states using an appointive
method.
B. Partisan Election
Partisan elections are generally perceived to be at the opposite end
of the independence/accountability spectrum from appointive meth-
ods of selection and retention. 75 Most commentators are of the view
that partisan election of judges came into vogue as a part of the wave
of popular democracy that engulfed the nation during the era of An-
drew Jackson's presidency, 76 as a response to the perceived abuses of
the then prevalent appointive methods77 and the "elitist" judges those
methods produced.
78
73. See, e.g., John L. Hill, Jr., A Time of Challenge: Judicial Reform in Texas, 52 Tax.
B.J. 165, 165 (1989); Moog, supra note 37, at 69-70; Tom Watson, The Run for the Robes,
GOVERNING, July 1991, at 50, 51; Korzen, supra note 38, at 254. Roy Schotland of Georgetown
University Law Center, an expert in the area, has described the situation as follows: " 'Judicial
elections have entered a new era, one which I like to characterize as noisier, nastier and costlier
than ever before.' " Hansen, supra note 37, at 45.
74. See, e.g., Davidow, supra note 39, at 428. For instance, in California, roughly 8097o of
all judicial appointees came from the governor's party during the administrations of Edmund G.
Brown, Sr., Ronald Reagan, and Edmund G. Brown, Jr. In general, those appointees also
shared the ideology of the governor making the appointment. Dubois, supra note 51, at 25. Not
surprisingly, in those states where judges are appointed by the legislature, former legislators are
appointed to the bench in far greater numbers than elsewhere. See Glick & Emmert, supra note
69, at 232; Korzen, supra note 38, at 274.
75. See generally Dubois, supra note 3, at 49-50.
76. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 46, at 64; Grodin, supra note 13, at 1971; Krivosha,
supra note 52, at 128; Nejelski, supra note 3, at 453; Pearson & Castle, supra note 4, at 34;
Korzen, supra note 38, at 258. But see Dubois, supra note 3, at 35 (arguing that the rise of
partisan elections was primarily a result of actions by moderate lawyers and judges, wishing to
provide the judiciary with an independent basis of legitimacy, rather than radical populists).
Mississippi was the first state to adopt partisan elections as the method for selection of all
judges, in 1832. See Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel, Introduction, in JUDIcIAl RFo~m
IN TE STATES 1, 6 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
77. See generally GLENN R. WINTERs, S .e TION or JUDoES IN NEw YORK AND IN OTHER
STATES 2 (1946); Winters, supra note 52, at 1.
78. According to one commentator, many viewed appointed judges as
not simply undemocratic but essentially anti-democratic-that is, they not only were
not bound by the will of the people, but seemed willfully to go against it. This was the
very evil that the Revolution had been fought to undue [sic]. In the popular mind,
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Although employed by a majority of states at one time 7 9 today only
eight states use partisan elections as the principal method of selecting
judges for appellate and general jurisdiction trial courts.80 Of those
eight, only six also use partisan elections for retention purposes.,'
The principal argument of proponents is that partisan elections is
the only method by which accountability of judges can be ensured. 2
Unless judges are periodically required to submit themselves to the
electorate, there is no reliable means by which "bad" judges 3 can be
removed from office. Correlates to this argument are arguments that
judges, like legislators, make law and, therefore, should be selected
and retained in the same manner as are legislators;84 and that the right
to vote is one of the most precious rights enjoyed by citizens of this
country, and all attempts to circumscribe or diminish that right should
be resisted.15
then[,] the judges represented everything that the old order had been-elitism, corrup-
tion, arrogance.
Carter, supra note 45, at 3. See also BERKSONJ ET AL., supra note 49, at 3; WrNTERS, supra note
77, at 2-3.
79. "At the beginning of the Civil War, . .. 24 of the 34 states provided for the election of
judges." Champagne, supra note 46, at 64. See also Grodin, supra note 13, at 1971; Winters,
supra note 52, at 1.
80. In Alabama, all judges must stand for election every six years. In Arkansas, supreme
court and court of appeals judges must stand for election every eight years, chancery court
judges must stand for election every six years and circuit court judges must stand for election
every four years. In Illinois, supreme and appellate court judges must stand for election for an
initial 10-year term, after which they are subject to retention elections at 10-year intervals; and
circuit court judges must stand for election for an initial 6-year term, after which they are sub-
ject to retention elections at 6-year intervals. In Mississippi, supreme court judges must stand for
election every eight years, and chancery and circuit court judges must stand for election every
four years. In North Carolina, all judges must stand for election every eight years. In Pennsyl-
vania, all judges must stand for election for an initial 10-year term, after which all are subject to
retention elections at 10-year intervals. In Texas, supreme court, court of criminal appeals and
court of appeals judges must stand for election every six years, and district court judges must
stand for election every four years. In West Virginia, supreme court judges must stand for elec-
tion every twelve years, and circuit court judges must stand for election every eight years. Mc-
FADDEN, supra note 10, at 178-87.
81. The six states are Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas and West
Virginia. See supra note 80.
82. See generally Champagne, supra note 46, at 64; Dubois, supra note 3, at 49-50; Felice &
Kilwein, supra note 45, at 197; Dunn, supra note 15, at 285.
83. Not infrequently, the adjective "bad" is used to describe judges whose decisions are
perceived as at odds with the views of the majority. See generally Harding, supra note 20, at
1163; Shapiro, supra note 38, at 1568-69; Korzen, supra note 38, at 260.
84. See Harding, supra note 20. See also Shapiro, supra note 38, at 1562; Thompson, supra
note 31, at 2062.
85. See generally Chemerinsky, supra note 44, at 1988; John D. Felice et al., Judicial Re-
form in Ohio, in JUDICIAL REFORM IN TrIM STATEs 51, 51-52 (Anthony Champagne & Judith
Haydel eds., 1993); Felice & Kilwein, supra note 45, at 197.
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Many commentators question the validity of the initial premise of
proponents of partisan elections-that partisan elections ensure judi-
cial accountability. Commentators point out that most judges in states
which use partisan elections initially reach the bench by interim ap-
pointment to an unexpired term, and are then re-elected periodically,
more often than not without opposition. 6 In addition, most voters
know virtually nothing about the qualifications of candidates for judi-
cial office 7 and, as a result, generally end up casting their votes based
upon cues, such as party affiliation" or name recognition. 9 More-
over, they note that there is almost always a significant voter drop-off
between more high-profile political races and judicial races-because
voters are unable intelligently to cast their vote for judicial candidates,
many simply do not vote in those races. 90 As a result, the few races
that are contested are generally decided by a very small minority of
the electorate, most of whom have no rational basis for their vote. 91
While perhaps once accurate, portions of these arguments are be-
ginning to be refuted by changes in the politics of judicial elections. In
particular, in the last decade, the number of contested elections has
86. See generally Champagne, supra note 72, at 146; Glick, supra note 51, at 516-17; Han-
sen, supra note 37, at 45; Kaminsky, supra note 47, at 468-69; Dunn, supra note 15, at 286.
87. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 46, at 95; Champagne, supra note 72, at 151; Dubois,
supra note 3, at 43; Dunn, supra note 49, at 125; Johnson & Urbis, supra note 37, at 543-44;
David Rohde, Critics Charge Pennsylvania Courts Are Stuck in "Judicial Dark Ages, " CmHis-
TIAN SCt. MON., Nov. 1, 1993, at 7. This appears to be more prevalent in urban areas than in
rural. In the latter, there are far fewer candidates for judicial office, and voters tend to be more
familiar with those who do run. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 72, at 151. It has been sug-
gested that one reason for such a low level of voter knowledge is the fact that judicial candidates
are prevented by ethical constraints from intelligently discussing any issues. See, e.g., Hojnacki
& Baum, supra note 72, at 301; Lovrich et al., supra note 72, at 33; Dunn, supra note 15, at 290-
91.
88. See, e.g., Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform in Texas, in JuDicIAL. REFORM IN THa
STATES 93, 97 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993); Champagne, supra note 72, at
147; Hojnacki & Baum, supra note 72, at 306; Dunn, supra note 15, at 287; Rohde, supra note
87. But see Dubois, supra note 3, at 44 (arguing that voting cues based upon political party
affiliation are relevant, to the extent that party affiliation provides some indication regarding
candidates' political, social and judicial leanings). See also Champagne, supra note 46, at 96-98
(discussing studies indicating Democratic judges may decide cases differently from Republican
judges).
89. See, e.g., Dubois, supra note 3, at 45; Felice et al., supra note 85, at 57; Hojnacki &
Baum, supra note 72, at 300-01; Rohde, supra note 87. This often results in votes based upon
perceived ethnicity of the candidate. See Champagne, supra note 46, at 95.
90. See, e.g., BEcoMNo A JUDGE, supra note 69, at 39-40; George E. Brand, Selection of
Judges-The Fiction of Majority Election, 34 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'y 136, 143 (1951); Du-
bois, supra note 3, at 45.
91. See generally Brand, supra note 90, at 143. But see Lovrich et al., supra note 72, at 33
(suggesting that empirical data indicates that those who do vote in judicial elections are likely to
be atypical of the general electorate because of uncommon interest in public affairs and uncom-
mon knowledge about local government).
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increased fairly dramatically around the country.92 Moreover, those
elections are becoming increasingly acrimonious, 9" thereby generating
greater voter interest. 94
Assuming for purposes of argument that periodic contested elec-
tions do have some impact on judicial accountability, an assumption
as yet unproven empirically, the question remains whether the degree
of additional accountability attained as a result of those elections is
worth the price. Contested elections are expensive, 9 and they are be-
coming more expensive every day. 96 Moreover, in large states, they
have become extraordinarily expensive.
In the past, judicial elections were low-key affairs, conducted with
civility and dignity. As a result, they were relatively inexpensive. 97
However, that is no longer the case. 9 Today, in many jurisdictions,
judicial elections have taken on all of the trappings of partisan poli-
tics,99 significantly increasing the resulting cost. Texas provides a par-
ticularly dramatic example of this development.
According to Anthony Champagne, a leading authority on Texas
judicial elections, "[s]upreme court races began to get expensive" in
92. Thus, in North Carolina, the coming of age of a viable Republican Party is fast chang-
ing the past system, in which Democrats, once appointed by the governor to complete a term,
seldom faced subsequent opposition. Korzen, supra note 38, at 265-66. The same phenomenon is
occurring in Texas. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 88, at 95-97; L. Douglas Kiel et al., Two-
Party Competition and Trial Court Elections in Texas, 77 JUDICATURE 290, 291 (1994). See also
Moog, supra note 37, at 69.
93. See, e.g., James C. Drennan, Judicial Reform in North Carolina, in JUDiclAL REFORuM
IN THE STATES 19, 28 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993); Hill, supra note 73, at
165; Moog, supra note 37, at 70; Reidinger, supra note 34; Roy A. Schotland, 1986-A Historic
Year for Judicial Elections, 70 JUDICAxuR 246 (1987); Watson, supra note 73, at 50-51. One
commentator has described the Texas situation as follows: "Judicial selection in Texas is interest
group politics-behind the mask created by words like 'good government,' 'reform,' 'quality
judges,' and 'democracy' is a bitter, partisan, high-stakes game for control of Texas' third
branch of government." Champagne, supra note 88, at 94.
94. See, e.g., Dubois, supra note 3, at 43-44; Hojnacki & Baum, supra note 72, at 301-02.
Increased voter interest may also be attributable, at least in part, to decisions invalidating judi-
cial ethics provisions which prohibit discussion of issues during contested elections. See, e.g.,
American Civil Liberties Union v. The Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990).
95. As one commentator has noted:
[Tihe process of electing judges is . . . an extremely inefficient method of selection.
Indeed, much of the time, money, and energy expended under the elective system is
minimally related, if related at all, to the selection of qualified judges. These wasteful
externalities cause artificially high opportunity costs which have ramifications
throughout the entire legal system.
Dunn, supra note 15, at 296.
96. This is generally true at all court levels, without regard to whether the elections are
partisan or nonpartisan. See Johnson & Urbis, supra note 37, at 545.
97. See, e.g., Hansen, supra note 37, at 45.
98. See generally Hansen, supra note 37 (discussing recent nationwide developments);
Moog, supra note 37, at 69-71 (discussing the situation in North Carolina).
99. See, e.g., Watson, supra note 73, at 50.
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1980, by which time "the election of Texas Supreme Court justices
had become a battleground for plaintiff and defense lawyers, each try-
ing to elect candidates favorable to their perspective."'1° In that year,
candidates for three open seats on the court raised $1.8 million. 10 In
1986, the "supreme court primary and general election contributions
overall totaled $4,624,321 and the four winning candidates had a total
of $2,954,280 in contributions. One winning candidate raised over
$1.4 million for his 1986 contested race."' 0 2 In 1988, the twenty candi-
dates for six seats on the court spent a total of $10,374,442 in the
primaries and the general election. 03 Two candidates raised over $2
million each, and a third raised almost as much. 104 In 1990, six candi-
dates for three seats on the court spent nearly $6 million. 105 Although
the numbers are not as great, the same trend is present in races for
other judicial levels in Texas.101 Moreover, cost should not be mea-
sured only in dollars spent by candidates. As John L. Hill, Jr., a for-
mer Texas Supreme Court Chief Justice has aptly pointed out, an
additional cost to the system is the time spent campaigning by incum-
bents-time which might be much better spent deliberating on and de-
ciding cases. 01
Texas is but the most graphic example. The trend is equally visible
elsewhere. In North Carolina, "[c]andidates for statewide judicial
races in 1986 spent more than those in 1980, 1982, and 1984 coi-
bined."' ° "In 1989, the winning candidate for a seat on Pennsylvan-
ia's supreme court spent more than $1.4 million .... ,"09 The trend is
even visible in relatively rural states. In 1990, campaign spending for a
seat on the Arkansas Supreme Court exceeded $500,000 for the first
time. "o
It is not merely the rapidly escalating cost of such elections that
produces concern. One must also consider where the money comes
from, and the perceptions created by such fund-raising activities.
Not surprisingly, lawyers have historically been the principal con-
tributors to candidates for judicial office."' As the cost of
100. Champagne, supra note 72, at 148.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 149.
103. Champagne, supra note 88, at 107.
104. Id.
105. Hansen, supra note 37, at 44.
106. Champagne, supra note 88, at 104-09.
107. Hill, supra note 73, at 165.
108. Korzen, supra note 38, at 266 (emphasis in original).
109. Hansen, supra note 37, at 44. A similar trend is evident with regard to other judicial
levels in Pennsylvania. See Dunn, supra note 49, at 121.
110. Hansen, supra note 37, at 45.
111. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 88, at 104; Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel,
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campaigning escalates, so does the size of contributions. Individual
contributions from lawyers have, in some cases, become staggering.
Again using Texas as an example, large contributions from lawyers
are relatively common.112 Historically, Texas judicial campaigns have
seen plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers on one side, and lawyers repre-
senting the insurance defense bar on the other."' This has been espe-
cially true with regard to supreme court races, because that is where
the state's tort law is made and, consequently, to a large extent, where
the fortunes of the plaintiffs' bar are made or lost." 4 In 1982, a well-
known plaintiffs' lawyer recruited a justice of the peace and financed
his successful campaign against an 18-year veteran of the court of ap-
peals because the lawyer was displeased over an adverse ruling by the
incumbent judge, which had taken away a large jury verdict." ' In
1984, one candidate for a seat on the Texas Supreme Court received
$1,043,879 in contributions. The list of contributors was 195 pages
long. However, seventy-six donors, all of whom were either related or
affiliated with the same law firm, accounted for more than half of the
total." 6 In 1986, lawyers contributed eighty, eighty-five and ninety
percent, respectively, of the total funds raised in three of the four
races for seats on the Texas Supreme Court." 7 Individual contribu-
tions by plaintiffs' lawyers in amounts of $20,000 or more have not
been uncommon."'
Lawyers also represent the single largest source of contributions in
Illinois. 9 Between 1980 and 1990, "[mlore often than not, candidates
who ran in elections they could not lose received the most contribu-
tions."10 This was true even for candidates who were unopposed.''
Although lawyers remain the principal source of funding in judicial
campaigns, in recent years, individual litigants and special interest
Conclusion, in JUDIcIAL REFORM IN TIM STATES 183, 184 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel
eds., 1993); Dunn, supra note 49, at 121; Marlene A. Nicholson & Norman Nicholson, Funding
Judicial Campaigns in Illinois, 77 JUDICATURE 294, 297 (1994); Marlene A. Nicholson & Bradley
S. Weiss, Funding Judicial Campaigns in the Circuit Court of Cook County, 70 JUDICATURE 17,
21(1986).
112. See Champagne, supra note 46, at 88.
113. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 72, at 148.
114. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 88, at 105.
115. See Champagne, supra note 72, at 149.
116. Id.
117. See Roy A. Schotland, Statement Before the Joint Select Committee on the Judiciary of
the Texas Legislature (Mar. 25, 1988), in Anthony Champagne, Judicial Reform in Texas. 72
JUDICATURE 146, 155 (1988).
118. See Champagne, supra note 46, at 90.
119. See Nicholson & Nicholson, supra note 111, at 297.
120. Id. at 294.
121. Id. at 297.
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groups which represent the interests of regular litigants have begun to
play a larger role in judicial campaign financing.122 Again looking to
Texas for examples, one individual who frequently finds himself in-
volved in court disputes "has given judicial campaign contributions to
single judicial candidates of over $100,000. ' ' 21 This same individual
contributed over $200,000 to the unsuccessful campaign of a candi-
date for the Texas Supreme Court in 1982, which sum represented
more than ninety percent of that candidate's total contributions. 24 In
1988, for the first time, Texas saw the large-scale involvement of non-
lawyer special interest groups in supreme court elections. The Texas
Medical Association and others concerned with the direction of medi-
cal malpractice decisions formed a political action committee which
became a major contributor to a number of candidates. 25
One need not be a rocket scientist to apprehend the impression cre-
ated by such contributions. As one commentator has graphically ex-
pressed it, contributions create the impression "that modern justice
may be going to the highest bidder.' ' 2 6 In addition to creating the
impression that justice is for sale, the need to participate in large-scale
fundraising is generally believed to discourage qualified individuals
from running (or seeking re-election),' 2 7 and "inevitably [to] lead to
heightened public distrust of the judicial process."'' 21
Notwithstanding the apparent problems associated with the
method, efforts to do away with partisan elections have been notably
unsuccessful in those states which continue to employ that method. In
North Carolina, "[slince at least 1958, judicial selection has been an
122. See, e.g., Champagne & Haydel, supra note 111, at 184; Hansen, supra note 37, at 45;
Hojnacki & Baum, supra note 72, at 302.
123. Champagne, supra note 88, at 104.
124. Champagne, supra note 72, at 149.
125. Champagne, supra note 88, at 103-04. The increasing incidence of large contributions to
judicial candidates by lawyers, litigants and special interest groups would appear clearly to sug-
gest that those making the contributions perceive judges as capable of having a major impact
upon public policy-that they make, rather than merely interpret, law.
126. Hansen, supra note 37, at 45. Another commentator has described what might aptly be
called "the paradox of judicial campaign financing" as follows:
On the one hand, money makes possible the campaign activities which provide voters
with the information they need about candidates and issues to make informed choices.
On the other hand, there is a concomitant fear that the money spent by candidates will
prove determinative in the outcome of election campaigns, thereby opening "the door
to influence-peddling by those who command sufficient resources to bankroll cam-
paigns."
Dubois, supra note 37, at 8 (footnotes omitted).
127. See, e.g., Dubois, supra note 37, at 9; Johnson & Urbis, supra note 37, at 541-42;
Moog, supra note 37, at 70.
128. Johnson & Urbis, supra note 37, at 542 (footnote omitted).
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issue of regular public debate." 12 9 Although reform has been urged by
the governor, the chief justice and the state bar association, 30 to date
no proposal has managed to clear the legislature."' The situation has
been much the same in Pennsylvania. There, the state bar association
has supported reform since as early as 1947.132 A poll taken in 1983
revealed that less than eighteen percent of those responding favored
the status quo.' Nevertheless, efforts to do away with partisan elec-
tions have been unsuccessful, largely because of the opposition of the
Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association and organized labor, '14 who
have been joined more recently by "the pro-life movement."'"
The fight has been especially acrimonious in Texas. There, the legis-
lature has frequently rejected proposals to do away with partisan elec-
tions. 3 6 Champagne has described the situation thus:
If a political issue can be given individual characteristics, judicial
reform in Texas would be the Harold Stassen of Texas politics. At
least since 1946 major reform efforts have tried to change the Texas
partisan election system for selecting judges to a commission
selection system .... To date, these numerous proposals to adopt a
commission selection [sic] share one fate-not a single one of these
proposals over the past forty years has gotten out of legislative
committee. ,17
The numerous proposals have not succeeded notwithstanding the sup-
port of the state bar association, several chief justices, numerous com-
missions, civic groups, the insurance defense bar, business groups and
at least one governor.'3 8 The lack of success has been due to the oppo-
sition of members of the supreme court, the two major political par-
ties, the plaintiffs' bar, organized labor, minorities and women, rural
interests and the Texas Civil Liberties Union.'39 Moreover, there is lit-
tle evidence that the electorate of Texas is convinced that a change is
needed. On the contrary,
129. Drennan, supra note 93, at 19.
130. See Moog, supra note 37, at 70.
131. See Drennan, supra note 93, at 43-45.
132. See Dunn, supra note 49, at 119.
133. Id. at 126.
134. Id. at 126-27.
135. Id. at 132.
136. See Champagne, supra note 46, at 55-57.
137. Champagne, supra note 88, at 93 (footnote omitted).
138. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 88, at 93-94, 102-03; Hill, supra note 73, at 168-69.
139. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 72, at 152-53; Donald W. Jackson & James W. Rid-
dlesperger, Jr., Money and Politics in Judicial Elections: The 1988 Election of the Chief Justice
of the Texas Supreme Court, 74 JUrDcATaRE 184, 185 (1991).
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[i]n a non-binding referendum held in 1988, 86 per cent of
Democratic primary voters opposed merit selection and a probability
sample of Texas public opinion conducted by The Texas Poll early in
1989 indicated that 71 per cent of Texans favor the election of judges
and that 70 per cent of them thought the current Texas judicial
system is fair.14o
One recent development might potentially cause those states which
still use partisan elections to switch to some other method of selection
and retention that does not involve elections. That development is the
Supreme Court's decisions in Chisom v. Roemer 41 and Houston Law-
yers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas'42 that section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965 14 applies to judicial elections. It is clear that
the effect of those decisions upon judicial elections will be signifi-
cant. 144 What remains to be seen is how significant. 45
C. Nonpartisan Election
Although generally treated as a separate method of selection and
retention,' 46 for most practical purposes nonpartisan elections may
best be understood as merely a subspecies of partisan elections. The
concept of nonpartisan elections was developed as a response to con-
cerns which arose in the mid- to late-nineteenth century over the facts
that judicial candidates were selected by political machines and that,
140. Jackson & Riddlesperger, supra note 139, at 185 (footnotes omitted).
141. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
142. 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988) (prohibiting denial or abridgement (dilution) of the right to
vote based upon race or color).
144. See, e.g., Johnson & Urbis, supra note 37, at 526-27. It has been argued that adoption
of an election scheme involving subdistricts or single-member districts, such as were urged by the
petitioners in Houston Lawyers Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas, 501 U.S. 419, 423 (1991),
would render judges "accountable to a smaller, more homogenous electorate," thereby permit-
ting special interest groups, by the prudent use of campaign contributions, to have a much
greater impact upon judicial decisions. Champagne & Haydel, supra note 11l, at 188-89.
145. According to Champagne, in Texas, application of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to
elected judges has caused "[tlhe debate over judicial selection [to] enter[J a new phase where
liberal Democrats and minorities see political gain in a system of single-member districts and
where conservative Democrats and Republicans are increasingly moving toward support of merit
selection .... " Champagne, supra note 88, at 112. But see Bradley v. Indiana State Election
Bd., 797 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (holding that section 2 of the Voting Rights Act applies
to retention elections for judges initially appointed pursuant to a commission, or "merit," selec-
tion plan). See also Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (1 lth Cir. 1994) (en banc) (holding that relief
will not be granted under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act if the remedy would undermine the
court's ability to administer justice), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
146. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 46, at 57; Pearson & Castle, supra note 4, at 34;
Korzen, supra note 38, at 269.
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as a result, judges were obligated to, and controlled by, those
machines. 14 7 As early as 1873, judicial candidates appeared on the bal-
lot without party label in Cook County, Illinois. 41 By the end of the
first decade of the twentieth century, some fifteen states were using
nonpartisan elections to select and retain judges. 149
Today, twelve states employ nonpartisan elections as the method by
which all judges are selected and retained. 50 In addition, five states
use nonpartisan elections to select and retain some or all of their gen-
eral jurisdiction trial judges."' Finally, Ohio, which is in a category by
itself, selects and retains all judges by nonpartisan election. However,
candidates for the nonpartisan general election are chosen in partisan
primary elections. 2
The principal argument of those who advocate nonpartisan election
for the selection and retention of judges is that it removes partisan
political considerations while ensuring the same type of judicial ac-
countability as do partisan elections. 13 Thus, so it is argued, judges
are more likely to be selected based upon qualifications than upon
political affiliation. 154 Proponents of nonpartisan election also argue
that such a system permits the people to retain their right to vote for
judges, while at the same time reducing the frequent turnover on the
bench that occurs in many partisan election states, because "[iun a
nonpartisan election system, good judges are usually unopposed." 5
147. See, e.g., BERKSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 4; Winters, supra note 52, at 1.
148. BERKSON ET AL.., supra note 49, at 4.
149. See Winters, supra note 52, at 1.
150. The twelve states are Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota,
Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington and Wisconsin. See MATIAS, supra
note 50, at 142, The terms of office vary from four years for district court judges in Idaho and
superior court judges in Georgia and Washington, to ten years for supreme court judges in
North Dakota and Wisconsin and supreme court and court of appeals judges in Louisiana. In
Montana, unopposed incumbents must stand for retention. See McFADDEN, supra note 10, at
180-87.
151. The five states are Arizona (counties with populations of less than 150,000 select and
retain superior court judges by nonpartisan election), California (local option permits choice
between gubernatorial appointment and nonpartisan election for selection of superior court
judges), Florida (all circuit court judges are selected and retained by nonpartisan election), Okla-
homa (all district court judges are selected and retained by nonpartisan election) and South Da-
kota (all circuit court judges are selected and retained by nonpartisan election). See McFADDEN,
supra note 10, at 178-88.
152. Id. at 185, 188.
153. See, e.g., Thomas E. Brennan, Nonpartisan Election of Judges: The Michigan Case, 40
Sw. L.J. (Special Issue), May 1986, at 23, 23-24; Champagne, supra note 46, at 63; Korzen,
supra note 38, at 269. Of course, this argument has no application to the Ohio system, where
candidates for the nonpartisan general election are chosen by partisan primary elections.
154. See Champagne, supra note 46, at 63.
155. Brennan, supra note 153, at 26.
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Most commentators contend that, far from being an improvement
upon partisan elections, nonpartisan elections are an inferior
alternative to partisan elections because they possess all of the vices of
partisan elections and none of the virtues. 56 As with partisan elec-
tions, most voters in nonpartisan elections know little about the quali-
fications of the candidates.'17 However, because the party voting cue
is not available in nonpartisan elections, even more voters are rele-
gated to basing their vote upon irrelevant factors,'58 such as ballot po-
sition and name.159 Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that
voter drop-off is even more significant in nonpartisan judicial elec-
tions-voter apathy is endemic in most nonpartisan races.'6 Because
of these factors, incumbents overwhelmingly win re-election, regard-
less of ability.' 6'
156. See, e.g., WINTERS, supra note 77, at 30; Jackson & Riddlesperger, supra note 139, at
189; Kaminsky, supra note 47, at 490; Dunn, supra note 15, at 292-93; Korzen, supra note 38, at
270.
157. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 46, at 63; Kaminsky, supra note 47, at 490; Jack
Ladinsky & Allan Silver, Popular Democracy and Judicial Independence: Electorate and Elite
Reactions to Two Wisconsin Supreme Court Elections, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 128, 161; Laura Ben-
son, Comment, The Minnesota Judicial Selection Process: Rejecting Judicial Elections in Favor
of a Merit Plan, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 765, 774-75 (1993); Korzen, supra note 38, at 270.
158. See Jackson & Riddlesperger, supra note 139, at 189.
159. See, e.g., Felice et al., supra note 85, at 57; Kaminsky, supra note 47, at 492. See also
Benjamin H. Hill, III, The Case for Merit Selection and Retention of Trial Judges, in MERIT
SELECTION AND RETENTION OF TRIAL JUDGES: MATERIALS HANDBOOK 7 (Governmental Affairs
Division, The Florida Bar ed., 1991) (noting that, in a recent trial court race, a candidate
changed her name to appear first on the ballot); Benson, supra note 157, at 775 (noting that
"some commentators felt that name recognition contributed to the successful candidacy of Alan
Page" for a seat on the Minnesota Supreme Court). A reporter has described the practice in
Dade County (Miami), Florida, trial court races as follows:
Judicial elections are a controversial exercise everywhere, but in Dade they aspire to
tragicomedy.
This year .... as in all years, there are no issues, not even party labels to provide a
helpful hint as to ideology. The candidates are prohibited by judicial canons from
saying anything of interest .... So ... the average voter will look at the ballot and
see all the names of people who want to be judge and the voter will make a mental
association .
Names. Judicial elections are about names.
Joel Achenbach, Juris Impuris, Mt An HERALD, Aug. 28, 1988, Tropic Magazine 10, reprinted in
MERIT SELECTION AND RETENTION Os TRIAL JUDoS: MATERIALS HANDBOOK 23, 23-24 (Govern-
mental Affairs Division, The Florida Bar ed., 1991). But see American Civil Liberties Union v.
The Florida Bar, 744 F. Supp. 1094 (N.D. Fla. 1990) (enjoining enforcement of portions of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which proscribe announcement of views by judicial candidates on
disputed legal and political matters).
160. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 46, at 63; Kaminsky, supra note 47, at 490-91; Kor-
zen, supra note 38, at 270.
161. See, e.g., Korzen, supra note 38, at 270. The argument of proponents that nonpartisan
elections are better than partisan elections because "good judges are usually unopposed" and,
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These are not the only problems associated with nonpartisan elec-
tions. Like partisan elections, nonpartisan elections are becoming
much more expensive. 62 In fact, some argue that they are more expen-
sive than partisan elections because, in the absence of party labels, it
costs more to reach and inform the voters. 63 Thus, the 1986 Ohio
nonpartisan election for chief justice cost some $2.8 million,'6 of
which approximately $1.7 million was spent by the unsuccessful in-
cumbent.165 This phenomenon is not limited to appellate court races.
In South Florida trial court races, the cost of campaigns has, likewise,
risen dramatically. One relatively recent circuit court race in Dade
County (Miami) "was reported to have cost over $500,000, most of
which was spent to purchase name identification."' 66 According to
one commentator, in South Florida, "[c]ircuit court campaigns cost
an average of $100,000, often reach $250,000 to $300,000, and one
reported [sic] having spent $600,000.11167
As in partisan elections, contributions in nonpartisan elections
come principally from lawyers who practice in the courts to which the
candidates are seeking election, and from litigants in those courts. 6
Also, as in partisan elections, in nonpartisan elections the inevitable
impression created by such contributions is that justice is for sale. 169
Another interesting fact, based upon the experience in Florida with
nonpartisan election of trial judges, suggests that nonpartisan election
may be a less desirable system. In Florida, while trial judges are gener-
ally selected and retained by nonpartisan elections, as in most states, 70
therefore, the frequent turnover of judges present in partisan election states is avoided, see supra
note 155 and accompanying text, would seem to detract from the argument that nonpartisan
elections ensure accountability because, if unopposed, judges would not appear on the ballot.
162. See, e.g., Benson, supra note 157, at 778.
163. See, e.g., Champagne, supra note 46, at 63; Korzen, supra note 38, at 270.
164. See, e.g., Felice et al., supra note 85, at 55-56.
165. See Hansen, supra note 37, at 44. Long-time justice of the Washington Supreme Court
Robert F. Utter reportedly "[t]wice . had to take out a second mortgage on his home to retire
a campaign debt." Id.
166. THE FLORIDA BAR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MERIT SELECTION AND RETENTION OF
TRIAL JUDGES 18 (1990).
167. John L. Remsen, Is Merit Selection and Retention a Good Idea?, FLA. BAR NEWS, Jan.
15, 1990, at 1 (footnote omitted).
168. See, e.g., Champagne & Haydel, supra note 11, at 184; Benson, supra note 157, at
778-79; Peter D. Webster, Selection and Retention: A Proposal for Change, FLA. BAR NEws,
Feb. 1, 1990, at 6.
169. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. See also Benson, supra note 157, at 778-
79. But see MacKenzie v. Super Kids Bargain Store, Inc., 565 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1990) (holding
that, notwithstanding undeniable perception that judge will be biased in favor of contributing
attorney or litigant, given requirement that trial judges participate in contested elections, a legal
contribution to a judge is not, itself, a sufficient ground to require recusal).
170. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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interim appointments are made by the governor, pursuant to a "merit"
system.' 7' Generally, what empirical work has been done on the subject
indicates that the method of selection has little, if any, effect upon the
overall quality of judges. 72 However, remarkably, in Florida, since
1966, all trial judges removed for misconduct initially reached the bench
by election. 73
As is true with partisan elections, notwithstanding the obvious prob-
lems associated with them, efforts to do away with nonpartisan elections
have met with little success. Ohio, where judicial elections have been a
subject of reform proposals since the late 1920s,174 provides an excellent
example. In 1987, an initiative proposing that election of judges be dis-
carded in favor of a "merit" system was defeated by a two-to-one vote,
despite the support of the state bar association, the League of Women
Voters, the business community, insurance companies and some forty
other groups, including Common Cause, the PTA, the Council of
Churches and various farm groups.75 The principal opponent was the
Ohio chapter of the American Federation of Labor/Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations. 76 The chief justice was also a vocal opponent,'rand
both major political parties also opposed the initiative, albeit less vo-
cally. 78 Efforts to do away with nonpartisan elections have also been un-
successful in Washington' 79 and Louisiana. ' ° While the Chisom v.
Roemer'5 ' and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General of Texas5 "'
decisions will likely also have a significant effect upon nonpartisan elec-
tions, 8 as with partisan elections, I 4 the extent of that effect remains to be
seen.
171. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1 (b).
172. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
173. See THE FLORIDA BAR, BAR-RELATED ISSUES BACKGROUND PAPERS 63 (1993).
174. See Felice & Kilwein, supra note 45, at 194.
175. Id. at 194-95.
176. Id. at 197.
177. Id. Interestingly, although the initiative was soundly defeated, so was the chief justice.
Id. at 200.
178. Id. at 197.
179. See David Burke, Judicial Reform in Washington State. in JUDicIAL REFORM IN THE
STATES 163, 168 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993).
180. See Judith Haydel & Thomas Ferrell, Judicial Reform in Louisiana, in JUDICIAL RE-
FORM IN THE STATES 73, 75 (Anthony Champagne & Judith Haydel eds., 1993). The authors'
colorful explanation for the failure of reform efforts reads:
With a political culture that is not especially concerned with ethical questions and that
even finds misconduct by politicians entertaining, if carried out with style, it might be
expected that more traditional governmental reforms, including reform of judicial se-
lection procedures, would find no acceptance in Louisiana. So far, they have not.
Id. at 74.
181. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
182. 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
183. In fact, Chisom v. Roemer arose in Louisiana.
184. See supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
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D. "Merit" Plans
Commission selection, more commonly referred to as either "Mis-
souri Plan"'8 5 selection or "merit" 186 selection, is generally perceived
to be a compromise between appointive methods and elective meth-
ods. "'87 The system grew out of the Progressive Reform Movement
shortly after the beginning of the twentieth century 88 and, in particu-
lar, from the ideas of Roscoe Pound, then Dean of the University of
Nebraska School of Law; John H. Wigmore, then Dean of North-
western University School of Law; and Albert Kales, a colleague of
Wigmore's at Northwestern. 8 9 The first concrete proposal regarding
such a plan came from Kales in 19 14 .190 That initial proposal was fur-
ther refined and embellished upon over the next twenty years. ' 9'
In 1934, California voters became the first to adopt a commission
method of selection. They approved a proposal calling for nomina-
tions of candidates to fill vacancies on the supreme court and the
courts of appeal by the governor, subject to confirmation by a com-
mission composed of the attorney general, the chief justice of the su-
preme court, and a presiding justice of the courts of appeal. 92 Once
185. Although not the first state to adopt a commission plan, see infra notes 192-94 and
accompanying text, Missouri's system has been the one most frequently looked to as a model.
186. It is unclear from where this label first came. However, what is clear is that this value-
laden label is, today, a deliberate choice of most proponents of the system.
187. See, e.g., ABRAHAM, supra note 48, at 37-39; Pearson & Castle, supra note 4, at 34;
Shapiro, supra note 38, at 1561.
188. See, e.g., Belknap, supra note 43, at 81-82; Krivosha, supra note 52, at 128-29.
189. See Belknap, supra note 43, at 82-84.
190. In 1913, the American Judicature Society was founded, and Kales accepted the position
of Director of Drafting. Krivosha, supra note 52, at 128-29. The initial Kales proposal included
the following components: (1) nomination of a list of candidates for judicial vacancies by a
council, or commission, of presiding judges; (2) selection of individuals to fill judicial vacancies
by the state's chief justice, who would be chosen and retained by contested popular election; (3)
a requirement that the chief justice select every second appointee from the list submitted by the
judicial council; and (4) a requirement that all appointees stand periodically in retention elec-
tions, at which voters would decide whether they should continue in office, or the position be
declared vacant. See, e.g., BERKSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 5; Krivosha, supra note 52, at 129;
Roll, supra note 48, at 843.
191. See, e.g., BEa KSON ET AL., supra note 49, at 5-6; Krivosha, supra note 52, at 129-30;
Winters, supra note 18, at 3-5. In 1928, Herbert L. Harley, a founder of the American Judica-
ture Society and its first secretary, proposed that the governor, rather than the chief justice,
select appointees to fill vacancies on the bench from a list of eligible candidates named as the
result of a plebiscite by bar members. See, e.g., BaRxsoN ET AL., supra note 49, at 5; Krivosha,
supra note 52, at 129-30; Winters, supra note 18, at 4.
192. See, e.g., Culver & Wold, supra note 46, at 140-41; Grodin, supra note 13, at 1972;
Grodin, supra note 18, at 365-66; Krivosha, supra note 52, at 130.
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confirmed, the judge was required to stand for retention 9 3 at the next
gubernatorial election and, thereafter, at regular intervals.194 This
method, now generally referred to as the "California Plan," remains
in effect for supreme court and court of appeal judges today. 195
In 1940, Missouri voters adopted a commission plan for selection of
judges of the supreme court, the courts of appeals and the circuit
courts for Jackson County (Kansas City) and the city of St. Louis. %
The plan provided for the creation of nominating commissions com-
posed of lawyers selected by the bar, lay persons selected by the gover-
nor, and a judge, who served as chair. 9 " Each of the commissions was
to nominate three candidates for each vacancy, from which list the
governor was to select the appointee. 198 After a year, each judge was
to stand for retention in the next general election. 9 This method, now
generally known as the "Missouri Plan," remains in effect today.2°°
Since 1940, there has been a discernible trend toward adoption of
some sort of commission, or "merit" plan. 201 At present, some thirty-
two states and the District of Columbia use some type of "merit"
plan for selection of some judges. 2 2 The variations among the compo-
nents of the plans are myriad. 2 3 "Merit" selection, coupled with
193. Each judge's name would be placed on the ballot, without opposition, and the question
asked would be merely whether that judge should be retained in office for another term. See
generally Thompson, supra note 31, at 2011.
194. See, e.g., Culver & Wold, supra note 46, at 142; Grodin, supra note 18, at 365.
195. See, e.g., MCFADDEN, supra note 10, at 179; Thompson, supra note 31, at 2010-11. At
present, after standing initially for retention, supreme court and court of appeal judges must
again stand for retention at 12-year intervals. Id. at 2011. Local option permits a choice between
gubernatorial appointment and nonpartisan election for selection of superior court judges. See
supra note 151.
196. See Elmo B. Hunter, Revisiting the History and Success of Merit Selection in Missouri
and Elsewhere, 60 U. Mo. K. C. L. Rav. 69, 71 (1991).
197. See generally Watson, supra dote 18, at 2.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See id. It is now also used for selection and retention of circuit court judges in Clay,
Platte, and St. Louis Counties. See Hunter, supra note 196, at 72. At present, after standing
initially for retention, judges of the supreme court and the court of appeals must again stand for
retention at 12-year intervals, and circuit court judges must again stand for retention at 6-year
intervals. See McFADDEN, supra note 10, at 183.
201. According to the American Judicature Society:
A true merit selection plan consists of these basic elements: 1) a commission com-
prised of both lay and lawyer members to recruit, screen, investigate and evaluate
judicial candidates; 2) nomination to the appointing authority of a limited number of
candidates; and 3) appointment by the governor or other appointing authority.
AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS, Introduction
(1993).
202. See id. at 1-3.
203. Id.
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retention elections, is applied to all judges in six states,2 04 and to some
judges in an additional ten states.205
The principal argument made by proponents of "merit" selection,
regardless of the particulars of the given plan being discussed, is that
it removes politics from the process of selecting judges. 20 6 Almost al-
ways accompanying this argument is the correlative argument that,
because politics is removed from the selection process, the result is
selection of "better" judges. 207 Proponents also frequently claim that
more women and minorities reach the bench under "merit" selection
systems than under systems based upon contested elections and that,
therefore, the result in states using some form of "merit" system is a
more diverse judiciary. 2 8
According to proponents, when coupled with a provision for peri-
odic retention elections, "merit" selection permits an accommodation
between the competing concepts of independence and accountabil-
ity. 209 Not infrequently, this argument will be accompanied by the ar-
gument that some form of "merit" selection, coupled with periodic
retention elections, is preferable to contested elections because the for-
mer will generally ensure greater security of tenure, thereby encourag-
ing "better" candidates to apply. 210
It is difficult to generalize regarding the validity of the claims made
by proponents and opponents of a "merit" system because of the
204. The six states are Alaska, Colorado, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah and Wyoming. See Mc-
FADDEN, supra note 10, at 178-87.
205. The ten states are Arizona, Florida, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Missouri, New York,
Oklahoma, South Dakota and Tennessee. See id.
206. See, e.g., Dubois, supra note 3, at 33; Hunter, supra note 196, at 72; Krivosha, supra
note 15, at 15; Rutledge R. Liles, The Case for Merit Selection/Retention of Trial Judges, FLA.
B.J., Mar. 1989, at 5, 6; O'Connell & Means, supra note 15, at 1155; Overton, supra note 39, at
15.
207. See, e.g., Davidow, supra note 39, at 450; Krivosha, supra note 15, at 19; Liles, supra
note 206, at 6; O'Connell & Means, supra note 15, at 1155-56; Overton, supra note 39, at 19.
208. See, e.g., Johnson & Urbis, supra note 37, at 559; Krivosha, supra note 15, at 19.
209. The following quotation aptly sets forth this hypothesis:
The Missouri Plan was a practical compromise between the goals of judicial indepen-
dence and public accountability. The combined system of initial merit selection and
subsequent retention elections was designed to obtain quality judges, maintain their
independence by insulating them from political influences, and provide public ac-
countability through a mechanism for removal of judges.
Larry T. Aspin & William K. Hall, Retention Elections and Judicial Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE
306, 306-07 (1994) (footnote omitted). See also AB.AHAM, supra note 48, at 35-39; Grodin, supra
note 18, at 365; William K. Hall & Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention
ElectionsHave Told Us, 70 JuDIcATrua 340, 341-42 (1987).
210. See, e.g., Garwood, supra note 69, at 21-22; Hunter, supra note 196, at 70; O'Connell
& Means, supra note 15, at 1155; Stanton, supra note 15, at 357; Dunn, supra note 15, at 289.
This argument would appear to be somewhat inconsistent with the argument that "merit" selec-
tion, coupled with retention elections, ensures some meaningful degree of accountability.
1995]
32 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
number of variations in the plans and the relative paucity of empirical
research. However, those on both sides of the issue generally agree
that one key to the success of any type of "merit" plan lies in the
provisions regarding the composition and powers of the nominating
commission."' To have any hope of achieving its asserted goals, such
a plan must be based upon provisions which ensure a truly indepen-
dent, 2t2 impartial,213 and diverse commission, 2 4 with the power and re-
sources to investigate thoroughly those who come before it as
candidates. 21 Most objective observers agree, further, that, in general,
the plans currently in use have not included such provisions. The re-
sult has been that, while partisan political considerations may, to a
certain extent, have been removed from the selection process, politics
is still a factor. 216 The forum for such political considerations has
merely been shifted from the electoral arena to the commissions2 17 and
the governor's mansion. 218
211. See generally Champagne, supra note 72, at 152; Alan T. Dimond, Judicial Merit Selec-
tion: A Legislative Odyssey, FsA. B.J., May1993, at 8; Hunter, supra note 196, at 74; Judicial
Nominating Commissions-The Need for Demographic Diversity, 74 JurDICATURE 236 (1991)
(editorial).
212. "Independent" is generally intended to mean independence from political control. See,
e.g., Hunter, supra note 196, at 74; Roll, supra note 48, at 890.
213. "Impartial" is generally intended to mean free of prejudices, in whatever form, as well
as cronyism. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 196, at 74.
214. See, e.g., id. "Diverse" is generally intended to mean a commission which reflects the
composition of the community at large in such matters as politics, sex, religion, ethnicity and
race. See, e.g., Davidow, supra note 39, at 430-31; Johnson & Urbis, supra note 37, at 558-59.
215. See, e.g., Russell Troutman, Florida Judicial Nominating Commissions, 54 FLA. B.J.
534, 536 (1980). See generally Kaminsky, supra note 47, at 475-84.
216. See, e.g., Kenyon D. Bunch & Gregory Casey, Political Controversy on Missouri's Su-
preme Court: The Case of Merit vs. Politics, 22 STATE & Loc. Gov'T REv., Winter 1990, at 5, 5-
6; Dubois, supra note 3, at 33; Glick, supra note 51, at 519-23; McMillian, supra note 4, at 13;
Roll, supra note 48, at 856-57; Leander Shaw, Jr., Florida's Judicial Merit Selection and Reten-
tion System: The Better Alternative, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. Riv. 283, 286 (1992); Volcansek, supra
note 4, at 86; Watson, supra note 18, at 5; Dunn, supra note 15, at 303; McClellan, supra note
10, at 547.
217. Politics of one form or another is frequently involved at the commission stage. See
generally Bunch & Casey, supra note 216, at 8-10; Champagne, supra note 46, at 61-62; Roll,
supra note 48, at 856; Troutman, supra note 215, at 534; Dunn, supra note 15, at 303; Mc-
Clellan, supra note 10, at 547.
218. While "merit" systems limit the discretion of the governor regarding the choice of
judges, the decision is still frequently based upon partisan political considerations because the
individual appointed tends to be a member of the governor's party. See, e.g., Champagne, supra
note 46, at 61; Glick, supra note 51, at 521; Roll, supra note 48, at 865-66; Dunn, supra note 15,
at 303. As a former chief justice of Missouri has expressed it, "[t]he governor, of course, is a
political person. When the constitution gives him complete discretion in selecting the appointee
from the panel, it is unrealistic to suggest that political considerations play no part in the ulti-
mate decision." Charles B. Blackmar, Some Observations on the Missouri Plan, 60 U. Mo. K.
C. L. REv. 77, 79(1991).
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As discussed previously, the subjective and normative considera-
tions involved in any attempt to define a "good" judge make empiri-
cal analysis of claims that a particular method of selection results in
the procurement of "better" judges extremely difficult. 2 9 Moreover,
existing empirical work suggests that the method of selection has little,
if anything, to do with the overall quality of judges. 20 However, some
evidence supports the claim that judges chosen by some type of
"merit" system may perform more competently those functions gen-
erally considered at the core of a judge's responsibility than do judges
chosen by other means. For example, polls in states which have
adopted some type of "merit" plan uniformly demonstrate that a ma-
jority believes that the "merit" plan is producing more qualified
judges than did the prior system. 221 Moreover, empirical data in
Florida 22 and in New York223 suggests that judges who reach the
bench as the result of some type of "merit" system are less likely to
face discipline or removal than are those who reach the bench by
other means.
One cannot easily reconcile the conclusions drawn by commentators
from the empirical data regarding the effect of "merit" plans upon
the selection of women and minorities. Some conclude that the
method of selection has little effect upon the number of women and
minorities reaching the bench.224 Others conclude that, while contested
elections result in fewer women and minorities reaching the bench
than do other systems, women and minorities generally fare better un-
der appointive systems than under "merit" systems. 225 Still others in-
sist that "merit" systems bring the greatest number of women and
minorities to the bench. 226 The answer to this apparent conundrum
may lie in the scope of, and methods used in, the various studies.
219. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
221. See, e.g., Krivosha, supra note 15, at 19; Watson, supra note 18, at 5.
222. More than 88% of judges in Florida who have been disciplined reached the bench by a
means other than "merit" selection and, since 1966, all judges removed from office reached the
bench by popular election. BAR-RELATED IssuEs, supra note 173, at 63. See also Liles, supra note
206, at 6; Overton, supra note 39, at 19.
223. Although dealing with a very small group, one study found that more New York City
judges who had reached the bench by election were subsequently disciplined in some way than
were those who had reached the bench by "merit" selection. Henry, supra note 68, at 22. The
conclusion of the study was that "merit selection produces a younger, more representative, bet-
ter educated, highly qualified and more politically diverse judiciary." Id. at 23.
224. See, e.g., Alozie, supra note 63, at 315-16, 321-24.
225. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 70, at 331-32.
226. According to the American Judicature Society, "50 per cent of black state supreme
court justices and 49 per cent of women justices first reached the states' high courts under the
merit plan." Judicial Nominating Commissions, supra note 211, at 236. In Florida, "nineteen
1995]
34 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 23:1
Perhaps the most problematic component of "merit" systems is
that by which judges, once selected, are required periodically to par-
ticipate in retention elections. 227 The empirical evidence suggests that
retention elections are subject to virtually all of the criticisms directed
at partisan and nonpartisan judicial elections, and then some. Based
upon historical evidence, many commentators have questioned
whether retention elections actually ensure any meaningful degree of
accountability. 228 They note that, because incumbents stand for reten-
tion without an opponent, the elections have generally been very low-
key affairs, resulting in minimal voter interest in, and knowledge
about, qualifications and past performance. 229 As in nonpartisan elec-
tions, voters have no cues to assist them in voting. 20 Despite its ef-
forts, the organized bar has generally been unsuccessful in providing
voters with meaningful guidance. 23 1 As a consequence, voter drop-off
has been more significant in retention elections than in either partisan
or nonpartisan judicial elections. 23 2 Moreover, virtually all judges have
routinely been retained, regardless of qualifications and past perform-
ance.233 Thus, an analysis of data from ten states, covering some 1,900
retention elections between 1964 and 1984, revealed that the incum-
bent was not retained in only twenty-two cases.234
out of twenty-three black judges and forty-one out of seventy-one women judges came to the
bench through the merit selection process." Overton, supra note 39, at 20 (footnote omitted).
See also Henry, supra note 68, at 11, 16. But see Glick & Emmert, supra note 69, at 234 (con-
cluding that "merit" systems appear to limit the number of judges who are members of "minor-
ity" religions).
227. Retention elections are merely the most commonly used retention technique in "merit"
plan states. For instance, in Hawaii and the District of Columbia, retention (or reappointment)
decisions are made by a commission. See McFADDEN, supra note 10, at 179-80.
228. See, e.g., Hall & Aspin, supra note 209, at 342; Volcansek, supra note 4, at 87.
229. See, e.g., Hall & Aspin, supra note 209, at 342; Luskin et al., supra note 71, at 318;
Shaw, supra note 216, at 287; Volcansek, supra note 4, at 87.
230. See, e.g., Hall & Aspin, supra note 209, at 342; Luskin et al., supra note 71, at 318-19;
Volcansek, supra note 4, at 87.
231. See, e.g., Kenyon N. Griffin & Margaret M. Murdock, Practicing Attorneys and Judi-
cial Retention Decisions: Judging the Judges in Wyoming, 69 JUDICATURE 36, 37 (1985); Charles
H. Sheldon, The Role of State Bar Associations in Judicial Selection, 77 JUoDICArtRE 300, 302
(1994); Gary Toohey, Informing the Voters in Missouri's Retention Elections, 76 JUDICATURE
264, 271 (1993).
232. See, e.g., Hall & Aspin, supra note 209, at 342; Luskin et al., supra note 71, at 318;
Shaw, supra note 216, at 287; Watson, supra note 18, at 6.
233. See, e.g., Hall & Aspin, supra note 209, at 342; Luskin et al., supra note 71, at 318;
Volcansek, supra note 4, at 87; Watson, supra note 18, at 6. It has been noted that there is very
little voter differentiation among judges standing for retention in the same territory. All judges
on the ballot tend to receive similar affirmative vote percentages. Hall & Aspin, supra note 209,
at 346. This appears to have been true with regard to minority judges, as well. Luskin et al.,
supra note 71, at 319-21.
234. Hall & Aspin, supra note 209, at 343-44.
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However, other new, and more disturbing, trends appear to be de-
veloping with regard to retention elections. Polls and surveys indicate
an appalling amount of confusion and general lack of understanding
among voters regarding the purpose of retention elections.23 For
example, a poll conducted in 1990 on behalf of then Florida Chief
Justice Leander Shaw revealed that 17.3 percent of those responding
believed that "merit retention [was] similar to a recall election. ' 236 A
similar poll conducted in 1992 indicated that more than two-thirds of
Florida voters admitted some confusion about retention elections,
forty percent believed that judges appeared on the ballot because they
had done something wrong and only thirty percent understood that
retention elections were a normal event.237
In addition, the affirmative vote percentage appears to be consis-
tently declining over time. 28 Until 1976, the average affirmative vote
percentage in Missouri had been more than eighty. 239 By 1990, that
figure had dropped to fifty-nine.m While evidence indicates that a
certain percentage of voters automatically votes against retention, 2
41
judges standing for retention seem to face particularly difficult prob-
lems whenever a general anti-incumbent mood affects the electorate. 242
More troubling still is an apparent trend toward politicization of
retention elections, as special interest groups begin to recognize that
judges standing in such elections are at a tremendous disadvantage
when it comes to conducting a campaign. This trend appears to have
begun in California. In 1966, upset over a decision by the supreme
court invalidating an initiative allowing racial discrimination in the
sale and rental of housing which had been overwhelmingly approved
by the electorate, a loosely organized effort to deny retention to the
justices, while unsuccessful, resulted in an average affirmative vote of
sixty-five percent, compared with an historic average of eighty-five
percent. 43
235. See Toohey, supra note 231, at 264.
236. See Randolph Pendleton, State Chief Justice Faces Misconceptions About Vote, FLA.
TIsES-UNIoN, Oct. 23, 1990, at BI.
237. See Merit Retention? Confused? Just Vote "Yes" Seven Times, TALLAHASSEE DEMO-
CRAT, Oct. 20, 1994, at AI0 (editorial).
238. See, e.g., Hall & Aspin, supra note 209, at 344.
239. See Toohey, supra note 231, at 264.
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., Randolph Pendleton, Politics May Color Justice's Plight, FLA. TIMES-UNION,
Feb. 17, 1990, at A7.
242. See, e.g., Hall & Aspin, supra note 209, at 347; Anti-incumbency's Threat to Judicial
Merit Selection, 76 JUDICATURE 56 (1992) (editorial) (noting that, because of ethical restraints,
judges are unable to speak out in the absence of active opposition).
243. See Culver & Wold, supra note 46, at 152-53.
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In 1977, Rose Bird was appointed Chief Justice of the California
Supreme Court.2A She was criticized from the outset as unqualified.241
In 1978, she stood for retention. 246 "Several conservative 'law-and-or-
der' groups, agribusiness organizations, and a coalition of public offi-
cials, marshalled opposition . . ."24 She managed to win retention,
but only by a mere two percentage points.2 4
By 1986, when Bird was again required to stand for retention, her op-
ponents were ready 29 A coalition consisting of district attorneys and
other law enforcement groups, "law-and-order" proponents, anti-abor-
tion groups, agribusiness interests and Republicans, unhappy with rulings
emanating from the supreme court, mounted a massive campaign to por-
tray Bird (and Justices Reynoso and Grodin, who were also on the bal-
lot) as ultra-liberal.m They placed particular emphasis upon the votes of
the three justices in death penalty cases, contending that the justices were
"soft on crime." 2 1 Because of ethical restraints and other factors, the
justices were ill-prepared to do battle .2 2 The result was an overwhelming
defeat for all threeA3 According to Justice Grodin, he and the other two
justices "raised nearly $4 million," and their opponents "raised approxi-
mately $7 million. ' '12 4 Of course, virtually all of this money came from
lawyers and special interest groups. 255
Retention elections similar to those in California in 1986 have since
occurred in Florida. In 1990, then Chief Justice Leander Shaw faced op-
position from anti-abortion activists and "law-and-order" groups upset
244. Id. at 153.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 154.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 154-55.
250. See, e.g., id. at 155; John H. Culver & John T. Wold, Rose Bird and the Politics of
Judicial Accountability in California, 70 JuDIcArR 81, 87-88 (1986); Grodin, supra note 18, at
367; Thompson, supra note 31, at 2036-37; John T. Wold & John H. Culver, The Defeat of the
California Justices: The Campaign, the Electorate, and the Issue of Judicial Accountability, 70
JUDICATURE 348, 349-50 (1987).
251. See, e.g., Culver & Wold, supra note 46, at 155; Grodin, supra note 18, at 366; Wold &
Culver, supra note 250, at 350. There seems to be a general agreement that, with regard to Bird,
these assertions were true. See. e.g., Culver & Wold, supra note 46, at 155; Thompson, supra
note 31, at 2034-35. However, there is some disagreement regarding their accuracy as to Reynoso
and Grodin. Compare Thompson, supra note 31, at 2036 (stating that all three justices were
"ultra liberal") with Grodin, supra note 18, at 367 (arguing that the three justices were lumped
together, notwithstanding "quite disparate" voting records).
252. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 18, at 368; Wold & Culver, supra note 250, at 350.
253. Bird received an affirmative vote of 34%, Reynoso received 40076 and Grodin received
43%. See Wold & Culver, supra note 250, at 350.
254. Grodin, supra note 18, at 368.
255. See id.
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with rulings of the court on matters of interest to them.26 Although
Chief Justice Shaw was retained, he received only a 60-percent affirma-
tive vote, compared to the 72-percent affirmative vote he had received six
years earlier.2 7 He was forced to raise and to spend some $300,000 on
the campaign.258 In 1992, then Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett received
similar opposition.359 She, too, was retained with an affirmative vote of
approximately sixty percent, which was several percentage points below
other supreme 'court justices on the same ballot, but unopposed.2W She,
too, was forced to spend some $300,000 on the campaign.26
It is difficult to determine empirically whether retention elections
have any impact upon the manner in which judges decide cases. How-
ever, one survey of judges subject to periodic retention elections re-
vealed that "three-fifths believe[d] judicial retention elections have a
pronounced effect on judicial behavior." 262 Many judges 'subject to
periodic retention affirm that this is true.263 In fact, former Justice
Hans Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court has said that "[r]etention
elections, with their simple yes or no choice, more directly but crudely
hold judges politically accountable on a single popular issue, usually
but not always crime, and therefore are a greater challenge to judicial
independence and courage. ' ' " In addition, just as in partisan and
nonpartisan elections, when judges face organized opposition in reten-
tion elections, they must look for campaign contributions to lawyers
and other groups having an interest in matters that come before the
courts. 265 Also, just as in partisan and nonpartisan elections, an ap-
pearance of impropriety is inevitably created. 266
Finally, it is as yet unclear whether section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act of 19.65267 will be held to apply to retention
256. See Pendleton, supra note 236, at B4; Randolph Pendleton, Victim's Brother Wants
Chief Justice Removed, FLA. TmEs-UNION, Sept. 11, 1990, at BI.
257. See Charles-Edward Anderson, Judicial Politics, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 34; Pendle-
ton, supra note 241, at A7.
258. See Hansen, supra note 37, at 45.
259. See Jan Pudlow, Law Enforcement Splits on Barkett, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Sept. 9,
1992, at C I; Diane Rado, Fiery Debate Rages Ever Hotter over Chief Justice's Keeping Job, ST.
PETERSBURr TtMws, Sept. 9, 1992, at B4.
260. See BAR-REI ArED IssuEs, supra note 173, at 64.
261. See Barkett Retaining Her Seat, TALL.AHASSEE DEMoCRAT, Nov. 4, 1992, at BI.
262. Aspin & Hall, supra note 209, at 312.
263. See Grodin, supra note 13, at 1980.
264. Linde, supra note 6, at 2004.
265. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 13, at 1981; Shaw, supra note 216, at 286.
266. See, e.g., Grodin, supra note 13, at 1981; Hansen, supra note 37, at 45; Nicholson &
Nicholson, supra note 111, at 294.
267. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
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elections.2 61 If it is, the effect upon continued use of retention elec-
tions will, undoubtedly, be substantial.
IV. SOME PROPOSALS FOR COMPROMISE
By this point, the answer to the question posed by the title of this
Article should be clear. There is no one "best" method for selection
and retention of judges. Rather, what method is "best" for any
particular jurisdiction will, of necessity, involve numerous norma-
tive and political considerations. The method chosen will reflect the
balance achieved among the many, often conflicting, objectives
viewed in the particular jurisdiction as important. As one commen-
tator has noted, "a realistic assessment of the inherent tensions sug-
gests that the choice of a selection method will require unavoidable
trade-offs. ' 269 Moreover, one must recognize that a certain degree
of ambivalence exists in our society regarding "the role of judges
within the political process. 270
It would be foolhardy to suggest that the judiciary is not a politi-
cal institution. However, it is clear that, in this country, "it was
intended to be the least partisanly [sic] political institution of the
government." 27' Nevertheless, as one commentator has pointed out,
"[tihe process of picking a person to be a judge is woven into the
political fabric and is, by any definition, a political process. 2 72 Ac-
cordingly, it would be unrealistic to suggest that it is possible totally
to remove politics from the process of selecting judges.2 73 Rather,
the goals should be to limit, to the extent feasible, the impact of
partisan politics and to minimize the effect of other political consid-
erations on the process.2 74
Two developments intimate that the time may be ripe for a num-
ber of jurisdictions to consider major changes in their methods of
selection and retention of judges. The first involves the growing rec-
ognition among voters in states which elect judges that, as election
costs escalate, elections become an increasingly inefficient means of
268. See Bradley v. Indiana State Election Bd., 797 F. Supp. 694 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (holding
that section 2 does apply to retention elections); but see Nipper v. Smith, 39 F.3d 1494 (1 1th Cir.
1994) (en banc) (holding that relief will not be granted under section 2 if the remedy would
undermine the court's ability to administer justice), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
269. Dubois, supra note 3, at 32.
270. Champagne, supra note 46, at 111.
271. Hickok, supra note 26, at 5 (emphasis in original).
272. Meador, supra note 9, at 122.
273. Id.
274. See generally Korzen, supra note 38, at 278.
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selecting judges, 2" and the recognition that the perception that
judges will be influenced by campaign contributions cannot but
erode public respect for the judiciary as an institution. 7 6 "Judicial
selection is re-emerging as an issue in many parts of the country
. . . .The reason is simple. Complaints about judicial elections-
their cost, their ethics and their consequences-are streaming in
from contests for the lowest municipal trial courts to state
[s]upreme [clourts across the land. ' 27  The second development, the
significance of which remains to be seen, is the effect that the Chi-
som v. Roeme a7t and Houston Lawyers' Ass'n v. Attorney General
of Texas279 decisions will have upon judicial elections, including re-
tention elections. 2 0 Accordingly, recognizing the practical28 ' and
political282 obstacles which confront any effort to construct a more
effective method of selection, it is, nevertheless, my belief that the
time may be right for such an endeavor.
My proposal is an effort to achieve a balance, to the extent feasi-
ble, between the competing views regarding what the role of judges
in our society ought to be. It is based in large part upon considera-
tion of the two developments just discussed. It involves a commis-
sion, or "merit," plan of selection. However, no plan in effect
today incorporates all of its components.
The proposal would call for several nominating and retention
commissions. For instance, in a state having a supreme court, one
intermediate court of appeal, circuit courts of general trial jurisdic-
tion and county courts of limited jurisdiction, there would be a sep-
arate nominating and retention commission for the supreme court,
the court of appeal and each judicial circuit. 23 The latter would be
responsible for the county courts within the circuit, as well. Each
nominating and retention commission would consist of nine mem-
bers, plus a judge chosen by the chief justice of the state, who
would serve as chair. 28 4 Not more than five members would be
275. See supra note 95.
276. See supra notes 126 and 169 and accompanying text.
277. Watson, supra note 73, at 49.
278. 501 U.S. 380 (1991).
279. 501 U.S. 419 (1991).
280. See supra note 268.
281. See Dubois, supra note 3, at 32.
282. See Philip L. Dubois, The Politics of Innovation in State Courts: The Merit Plan of
Judicial Selection, PtaLiUs, Winter 1990, at 23, 28-32.
283. The intent behind this provision is to ensure that commission members will be chosen
from a geographic area coextensive with the jurisdiction of the court in question.
284. There is nothing novel about this component. Participation by judges in selection or
retention of their brothers and sisters has been an aspect of many "merit" plan proposals, in-
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permitted to be Republicans; and not more than five would be per-
mitted to be Democrats. Five members would be required to be law-
yers, 285 and five would be required to be non-lawyers. Three
members would be chosen by the governor, three by the leader in
the upper house of the state legislature of the party opposite to that
of the governor and three by the state bar association. All nine
would be required to be registered voters and residents within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court in question. At least one of the
three appointed by each individual or entity would be required to be
a member of a racial or ethnic minority, or a woman. 28 6
Once appointed, each member would serve for six years, provided
that the initial appointments would be staggered.to ensure institu-
tional continuity. No member would be eligible for consecutive
reappointment; and no member would be eligible for consideration
for any judicial vacancy while on the commission, or for a period of
two years thereafter.
Each commission would be required to be funded in an amount
sufficient to permit it to retain an investigator on a full-time basis
who would be charged with, among other things, checking the back-
ground and qualifications of applicants and the past performance of
those seeking retention. Adoption of a uniform written set of proce-
dures for interviewing and evaluating applicants and judges seeking
retention, to be used by all commissions in the state, would be re-
quired. All proceedings of the commissions, except deliberations
and votes, would be public. 287 Candidates, and judges seeking reten-
tion, would be prohibited from communicating with commission
members, except at commission meetings. 288 A majority vote of the
commission would be required for all actions.
cluding some of the earliest. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Today, some 15 states
and the District of Columbia include one or more judges on their commissions. See JUDIAl.
ManRrr SELECTION, supra note 201, at 1-3. One purpose of requiring that a judge serve on each
commission is to make available a source of information to other commission members regard-
ing the workings of the courts.
285. In general, one would expect that lawyers would be more interested in, and more famil-
iar with, the workings of the courts than would lay persons. The judge/chair of each commission
would be counted as one of the five lawyer-members.
286. Several states already have similar requirements. See Judicial Nominating Commissions,
supra note 211, at 236. There may be some question regarding the constitutionality of such a
rigid preference. See generally Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995) (all
racial classifications whether imposed by federal, state or local government, are subject to strict
scrutiny-they must serve a compelling governmental interest, and be narrowly drawn to further
that interest). However, were such a provision found to be constitutionally impermissible, a sim-
ilar provision that was merely hortatory, rather than mandatory, could be substituted.
287. The goal here is to increase public understanding and acceptance by increasing the visi-
bility of the process.
288. The intent behind this provision is to reduce the opportunity for political machinations.
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For each vacancy, the commission would be required to select
from among the applicants the three most qualified individuals, and
to submit their names to the governor. The commission would be
required, further, to rank the three individuals in order of their rela-
tive qualifications. In making its selections and rankings, the com-
mission would be required to consider the geographic distribution of
the population within the area served by the court in question, the
racial and ethnic composition of the population within the area
served by the court, the geographic distribution of the caseload
within the area served by the court, and whether the composition of
the court, in general, reflected such circumstances.2 9 The names and
rankings would be required to be made public. Within sixty days of
receipt of the three names, the governor would be required to ap-
point one of the three to fill the vacancy. If the individual appointed
was not the one ranked first by the commission, the governor would
be required to explain to the public the reasons for the choice. 290
The initial term of each judge so appointed would be two years. 291 A
judge wishing to remain on the bench would, six months before the ex-
piration of the 2-year term, inform the appropriate nominating and re-
tention commission in writing of that desire. The commission would
then investigate the judge's performance. If the commission were to
conclude that the judge's performance had been satisfactory, the judge
would be retained for a 10-year term, 292 at the conclusion of which, if
the judge still desired to remain on the bench, the process would be re-
peated. If the commission were to conclude that the judge's perfor-
mance had been unsatisfactory, the judge would not be retained, a
vacancy would be declared at the end of the judge's 2-year term, and the
selection process would begin anew.
Finally, to retain the possibility of voter participation in retention
decisions, a provision would be included for recall elections, initiated
by citizen petition. Accountability would also be ensured by a provi-
sion requiring the creation of a strong and independent judicial disci-
pline body, the proceedings of which would be public.2 93
289. Florida has recently enacted a requirement similar to this. See FLA. StAT. § 26.021
(Supp. 1994).
290. The intent of these requirements is to make it more difficult for a governor to appoint
based principally upon partisan political considerations, rather than qualifications.
291. This would be, in essence, a probationary term. The length of the term is intended to
permit a new judge to become accustomed to the position.
292. This term has been chosen because it is sufficiently long to afford some sense of job
security to the judge, while also providing a certain degree of accountability.
293. All 50 states and the District of Columbia already have some type of judicial discipline
body in place. See Arlin M. Adams, Who Will Control the Judiciary?, 70 JUDtICATURE 142, 143
(1986).
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Undoubtedly, this proposal will not satisfy all concerns of all peo-
ple regarding selection and retention of judges. However, I suggest
that it will accomplish the following: it will reduce political
considerations to an acceptable level, while largely neutralizing, if not
eliminating, partisan political considerations; it will actively encourage
consideration of the need for diversity on the bench, and thereby lead
to significant increases in the number of women and minority judges;
it will eliminate entirely the offensive elements of judicial elections;
and it will, in all likelihood, increase the public's respect and support
for the judiciary as an institution.
V. CONCLUSION
The debate over the proper role of the judiciary is at least as old as
our nation. The normative and political considerations inherent in the
various views regarding the proper role of judges in our society have a
great deal to do with one's choice of a method for selection and reten-
tion of judges.
All of the principal methods of judicial selection and retention cur-
rently in use in this country are, essentially, the result of perceptions
regarding the proper role of judges and, therefore, whether it is more
important that judges be independent or that they be accountable.
However, the empirical data reveals that all of those methods fail, in
one or more significant respects, to attain the goals they were designed
to realize.
The debate over the proper role of the judiciary is not likely to end
anytime soon. However, the growing realization in states which still
elect judges that the drawbacks associated with such methods far out-
weigh the benefits, coupled with the Supreme Court's rulings that sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 applies to the election of
judges, might provide the impetus for some states to reexamine the
methods used for selection and retention of judges.
Many obstacles, practical and political, stand in the way of any ef-
fort to construct a method of selection and retention that achieves a
reasonable balance among the competing views in our society as to the
proper role of judges. It may well be a practical impossibility to devise
a plan which satisfies everyone. However, the proposal suggested here
reaches a balance regarding a number of the most significant issues
which are, today, the subject of discussion. If nothing else, the pro-
posal provides a point of departure for further discussion and debate.
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